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ABSTRACT
SENSOR INTRUSION DETECTION IN CONTROL SYSTEMS USING
ESTIMATION THEORY

Jiayi Su, B.S.
Marquette University, 2018
In this thesis, two different approaches to sensor intrusion detection are presented.
In the first approach, an estimation algorithm using a bank of Kalman Filters is designed
that is capable of estimating the intrusion signal when sensors are affected in control
systems. The mathematical models of the control system will be estabilished and the system
measurement will be shown and after that, various false signals, such as constant-type and
ramp-type signal, will be selected as the intrusion signal to affect the system output
mentioned above. The system measurement will be tested based on a bank of Kalman
Filters. The probabilities of each intrusion state (affected and unaffected) of the control
system will be calculated as a function of time. The estimation of the states from a bank of
Kalman Filters together with the associated probabilities will determine whether the sensor
is under attack or not by using the information from the estimation algorithm. The
performance of the algorithm will be tested based on the various levels of the system and
measurement noise.
In the second approach, a new estimation algorithm is applied to detect the intrusion
signal targeting the system mentioned above. By calculating the sample mean value of the
system state and measurement in time, the changes of the system measurement can be
detected by calculating the residual between the actual value and the theoretical sample
mean value of the system measurement and in that case, the intrusion signal can be found.
Thesis conclusions, summary and future work is also mentioned in the last chapter of this
work.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Sensors are a critical part of feedback control systems, but they are volunerable to
attacks in cyber-physical systems. Such attacks may cause significant damage to
industrial control systems and this gives attackers a lot of chance to affect this important
element. Thus, detection and protection against attack signals become a significant work
to guarantee the proper operation of such systems. Estimation theory has been proposed
for many years and, as one can expect, many researchers have expanded on it. One
specific researcher, R.E. Kalman, came up with an approach to describe the discrete-data
linear filtering problem [1]. The technique he developed could be the way to estimate
system states and minimize system’s disturbance and noise, which could be a great tool
of detecting sensor intrusions. The development of the detection algorithm in this thesis
utilizes this method. To begin, it is important to have a general background to understand
how sensor intrusion happens and how to use this algorithm as a tool to make the
detection be possible.

1.1 Sensor Intrusion

Sensors play an important role for measuring system states while also being
vulnerable and sometimes exposed on an external environment, which makes it easy to be
attacked. Therefore, the number of sensor intrusions has increased significantly with the
development of the process control system. Sometimes sensor intrusion happens because
the system operates under a harsh environment, like being exposed to extremely cold
weather or to the sun for a long time, which makes the sensor unable to detect the correct
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system measurement signal. Usually, intruders hack into the sensor, replace the system
measurement with a false signal, which leads to a terrible result for the industrial process
and may cause a malfunction or permanent damage to its constituents.

There are various types of sensor attacks that could influence system’s
performance, such as surge attacks, bias attacks and geometric attacks. Surge attacks
allow intruders to achieve their maximum damage as soon as possible when they have
access to the system. Bias attacks let attackers change the system output by adding a
small disturbance over a large period of time. While geometric attacks let attackers try to
switch the state of the system at the beginning of the attack and then maximize the
damage after the system has been moved to a more vulnerable state [2].

A good example of intrusion targeting a control system is the Maroochy Shire
Council’s sewage control system in Queensland, Australia [3]. A hacker used a laptop
and a radio transmitter to take control of 150 sewage pumping stations. Over a threemonth period, he released one million liters of untreated sewage into a storm water drain
from where it flowed into local waterways. The attack was motivated by revenge on the
part of the hacker after he failed to secure a job with the Maroochy Shire Council.
Unfortunately, ways to detect those attacks are still limited because attack signals are
always hidden, which increases the difficulties of detection and observation of sensors
intrusion, and there are some techniques that show it is impossible to estimate sensor and
actuator intrusions under certain conditions [4].

3
Fortunately, estimation theory is widely applied for detecting and estimating
system output and state, which makes it easier to develop a method of observing the
attack signal.

1.2 Estimation Theory

Estimation theory is a branch of statistics that deals with estimating the values of
parameters based on measured empirical data that has a random component. The
estimation process could be done by using an estimator and historical data or
measurements to observe unknown parameters in real applications [5]. Usually, there are
three topics discussed under estimation theory, including smoothing, filtering and
prediction. Smoothing is a method of estimating the unknown historical parameters by
using current measurements. Filtering is a method of estimating the current unknown
parameters by using known measurements and prediction, which is a way of estimating
the future unknown parameters by using current measurements [6]. Problems with these
three branches could be approached by using different estimation methods, such as
Kalman Filter and its various derivatives, Particle Filter, Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC), Cramer-Rao Bound, Bayes estimators, Wiener Filter and Maximum likelihood
estimators. Also, a huge number of applications of estimation theory using the methods
mentioned above have been used in different technical areas as shown in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Applications of estimation theory [7].
Area of applications
Control Systems

Communications

Seismology

Biomedical
Image Processing

Radar Communications
Speech Signal Processing

Sensor Fault Detection

Examples
Estimate the position of a powerboat for
correcting navigation in the presence of sensor
and environmental noise.
Estimate the carrier frequency of a signal for
demodulation to the baseband in the presence of
degradation noise.
Estimate the underground distance of an oil
deposit based on the different densities of oil and
rock layers.
Estimate the heart rate of a fetus in the presence
of environmental noise.
Estimate the position and orientation of an object
from a camera image in the presence of lighting
and background noise.
Estimate the delay of the received pulse echo in
the presence of noise.
Estimate the parameters of the speech model in
the presence of speech/speaker variability and
environmental noise.
Estimate the sensor fault of the industrial control
system in the presence of noise.

In this thesis, estimation theory will be used to solve the sensor intrusion problem
and, the Kalman filter bank will be introduced and applied as the main estimation
algorithm for the topic disused in chapter 2 and 4.

1.3 Previous Work Involving the Use of Estimation Theory

In 1978, R. N. Clark introduced a method of detecting incipient instrument fault
[8]. The dedicated observer scheme (DOS) he introduced could be applied for estimating
the lateral axis control system of a hydrofoil boat. He used several observers where each
observer was designed for each sensor, and each observer could only receive its input
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signal from the paired sensors. Also, the plant input could be received from all observers.
In this case, the incipient fault could be detected if there is a fault input signal from a
certain sensor while the other estimated signal will remain identical. The logic unit he
used to make the decision of which sensor is affected is to set up a threshold value for
each instrument and the false alarm will not be triggered if the residual of each
instrument is less than the threshold value, otherwise the fault could be found and known
by using this unit.

In 2003, T. Kobayashi and D. L. Simon introduced the application of a bank of
Kalman filters for aircraft engine fault diagnostics [9]. They used multiple Kalman filters
where each Kalman filter is designed for a specific sensor fault. When a fault comes
through the sensor, all filters expect the one using a hypothesis similar to the faulty signal
will show large errors, which could detect the unique sensor fault. Comparing to R. N.
Clark’s work, T. Kobayashi and D. L. Simon were calculating the weighted sum of
squared residual (WSSR) for each filter and use WSSRs to compare with their preestablished thresholds. When a sensor is affected, every WSSRs expect the affected one
will go beyond their thresholds, which means the affected one is found successfully based
on their WSSR decision unit.

Similarly, W. Xue, Y. Guo and X. Dong applied the Kalman Filter bank as the main
estimation algorithm to detect aircraft engine sensor and actuator intrusion in 2007 [10].
The basic logic of their fault detection and isolation is firstly calculate the residual value
between low-pressure spool speed from sensors and estimated low-pressure spool speed
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from observer measurements and, the second step is to compare the residuals with
thresholds and as mentioned, all filters except the one using the correct hypothesis will
produce large estimation errors, which could let the fault signal be isolated.

In 2011, D. H. Trinh and H. Chafouk applied the Kalman Filter bank technique to
detect the intrusion signals in a wind turbine generator system [11]. The difference
between the previous work is that they used a different decision unit to isolate the
affected signal. A threshold was set firstly based on the estimated values and residuals,
and then the Page-Hinkley’s test was applied for the fault signal isolation. They claimed
that using Page-Hinkley’s test for the fault assessment is because its simplicity and it only
needs low computational power.

In 2017, G. Rigatos, D. Serpanos and N. Zervos implemented the same
technique on the power grid sensors fault detection [12]. After estimating systems states,
calculating residuals and setting up thresholds for each sensor, they applied the 𝜒 2 tests to
isolate the fault signal. The results of the detection of the intrusion signal could be found
by using 𝜒 2 tests, and the highest scores of the 𝜒 2 tests could show the compromised
sensor.

In 2017, M. Rezaee, N. S-Nokhodberiz and J. Poshtan developed a method of
using the Kalman Filter to detect and identify the sensor fault in an electro-pump system
[13]. Similarly, as mentioned before, they calculated the estimated states and
measurements of the electro-pump system and after that, they calculated the root mean
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square error (RMSE) comparing to the system state and measurement. By setting up an
upper bound of the RMSE, they could find if there’s an intrusion signal in the electropump system.

In 2018, Y. Chen, S. Kar and J. M. F. Moura use the optimal attack strategy to
attack the sensor and the controller they built in order to learn how a hacker could design
an intrusion signal so that the attack signal could cause the maximum damage [14]. After
knowing the optimal attack signal based on the system model, they also designed an
estimation method, which use 𝜒 2 tests to isolate the fault signal.

1.4 Scope of This Work and Main Contributions

This thesis proposes to develop a method to detect sensor intrusions in first-order
and second-order discrete-time system that have disturbances both in the systems state
and output. The distribution of the disturbances is proposed Gaussian and the intrusion
signal is firstly proposed a constant-type and then a step and ramp-type on both firstorder and second-order system outputs. A bank of Kalman Filters will be the main
algorithm of estimating system state and output, which provides the basis for information
available to know if the system is affected or not [19]. Mathematical models of control
system will be established and various false signals, such as constant and ramp signal,
will be selected and tested based on a bank of Kalman Filter. The probabilities of each
state (affected/unaffected) of the control system will be calculated as a function of time.
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The estimation of the states from a bank of Kalman Filters together with the associated
probabilities will determine whether the sensor is under attack or not by using the data
from the estimation algorithm. The performance of the algorithm will be tested based on
the various levels of the system and measurement noise.

1.5 Thesis Organization

This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 2 consists of an introduction
and derivation of the Kalman Filter and bank of Kalman Filters that have been proposed.
Chapter 3 consists of system modes with attack signals. The mathematical models for the
first-order and second-order discrete time systems with system and measurement noise
will be established and both the systems will be affected with constant-type and ramptype attack signal. Chapter 4 discusses the implementation of a bank of Kalman Filters
both on the first and second order systems with different attack signals. The performance
of the algorithm will then be tested based on the various levels of the system and
measurement noise. Chapter 5 is a summary of the previous chapters and suggestions for
future work.

9
2

A REVIEW OF ESTIMATION THEORY AND INTRODUCTION OF
KALMAN FILTER

2.1 Introduction: Development of the Estimation Theory and Kalman Filter

As mentioned in Chapter 1, estimation theory is a branch of statistics that deals
with estimating values of the states of a system based on measured empirical data that has
a random component. By using an estimator with historical data or measurements, the
estimation process could be used to estimate values of unknown parameters in real
applications as introduced in Chapter 1 [5].

With the growth of computational power, it is easier to use an observer to
estimate system states with a lot of measurement data. The Kalman filter (KF), as one of
the estimation algorithms, is developed to estimate system states and measurements in a
lot of fields. In this thesis, the sensor intrusion problem could be solved by using Kalman
Filter and one of its extensions, a bank of Kalman filter (BKF), to detect the changes of
the systems measurements and find the intrusion when there is an attack signal enters the
system and replaces the system measurement. Both the Kalman filter and a bank of
Kalman filters (KF and BKF) will be introduced and derived in this thesis and the
algorithms for applying these estimation methods into the sensor intrusion problems will
be shown. Some of the typical applications in different areas will also be given in section
2.2

10
In fact, most of these modern estimation-theory-based techniques can be found at
the heart of many electronic signal processing systems designed to extract information
[16]. Typical application areas and example applications in areas utilizing estimation
theory are listed in Table 2.1 [18].

2.2 Kalman Filter

The Kalman filter, also known as linear quadratic estimation (LQE), is a method
of estimating the unknown parameters and states of a system with statistical noise. It can
produce the estimated values of unknown variables and can also minimizes the mean of
the error. There are a huge amont of applications of using Kalman Filter in many
different areas, such as tracking problems, navigation problems, signal processing
problems and even in economics. Moreover, the Kalman filter is also a main topic in
robotic motion, where its used to optimize the trajectory of the motions. At the same
time, as one the estimation algorithms, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the Kalman filter
could be used to estimate not only the present state by giving the known measurements,
but the past and the future states of a system by some changes to the filter.

Basically, the Kalman filter works with two steps, the first step is called
prediction step or time update step, where it could produce the current state estimate
together with its associated noise value [15]. The second step is called measurement
update step or correct step, where the measurement could be updated using a weighted
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average, which could minimize the uncertainty of the measurement. Figure 2.1 shows the
process of the two steps below.

Time Update

Measurement Update

(“Predict”)

(“Correct”)

Figure 2.1: Process of the two steps of the Kalman Filter [15]

The Kalman filter is used to reduce the noise in systems states and outputs in
numerous applications and the noise is assumed Gaussian on most of the applications.
The Kalman filter can also work if the noise disturbance is not Gaussian.

The Kalman filter is named after R.E. Kalman, one of the primary developers of
its theory. In 1960, R.E. Kalman first developed a method of a recursive algorithm to deal
with the discrete-time linear filtering problem [1,16]. The recursive algorithm means the
estimated value 𝑥̂𝑘+1 can be calculated by using the previous estimated value 𝑥̂𝑘 . Later
on, the development of various extensions on the Kalman filter have been derived
targeting different kinds of problems and applications, especially for systems within the
security field. Nowadays it has been widely applied in engineering problems,
mathematical problems, biomedical problems and even economic problems, and most of
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the problems can be solved properly because of this technique. In some of the
applications, Kalman filter is a crucial technique and one cannot solve it without using
this technique. Some typical examples of applications by using Kalman filter are
introduced in Table 2.2.

Table 2.1: Typical applications of various forms of Kalman filter [18].
Area of applications
Navigation

Image processing

Radar communications
Control system
Economics
Speech signal processing

Forecasting
Sensor Fault Detection

2.2.1

Examples
To control and assist the navigation of
automobiles, aircraft or spacecraft using the
measured sensor data in the environment
with noise and disturbance [21].
Using various forms of Kalman filter to
estimate the position and orientation of an
object from a camera image in the presence of
lighting and background noise.
Estimating the distance/velocity of the target
object by various forms of the Kalman filter.
Active noise control in control systems [15].
Parameter estimation of linear or non-linear
econometric models [22].
To estimate the parameters of the speech
model and to get rid of the noise out of the
speech signal.
Estimating the parameters of the forecasting
model using the historical data.
To estimate the sensor fault of the industrial
control system in the presence of noise.

Derivation of Kalman Filter

Consider a linear discrete-time stochastic system with system states 𝑥𝑘 ∈ ℝ𝑛 ,
system measurements 𝑦𝑘 ∈ ℝ𝑝 , system inputs 𝑢𝑘 ∈ ℝ𝑚 and system matrices 𝐴𝑘 , 𝐵𝑘 , 𝐶𝑘
and 𝐷𝑘 , where 𝐴𝑘 , 𝐵𝑘 , 𝐶𝑘 and 𝐷𝑘 are all time-varying matrices,
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𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑣𝑘

(2.1𝑎)

𝑦𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑤𝑘

(2.1𝑏)

in (2.1a), 𝑣𝑘 is the system state noise, where the covariance of the noise is 𝑉𝑘 , and 𝑤𝑘 is
the system measurement noise, where the covariance of the noise is 𝑊𝑘 . 𝑆𝑘 is the cross
covariance, where it is between the covariance of the state noise 𝑉𝑘 and the covariance of
the measurement 𝑊𝑘 . The system state noise vector 𝑣𝑘 , system measurement noise
vector 𝑤𝑘 and the initial state value of the system 𝑥0 can be expressed with arbitrary
densities below,

𝑋0
𝑥0
𝑥̅0
[ 𝑣𝑘 ] ~ ([ 0 ] , [ 0
𝑤𝑘
0
0

0
𝑉𝑘
𝑆𝑘𝑇

0
𝑆𝑘 ])
𝑊𝑘

In this thesis, the sensor intrusion detection problem, 𝑥𝑘 represent the system
states, where it needs to be observed by Kalman filter, and 𝑦𝑘 is the system outputs.
Suppose 𝑢𝑘 represents the unit step input of the system, then the system estimated states
𝑥𝑘 could be known by using a Kalman filter with the system outputs as long as the
system is observable.

Before deriving the Kalman filter, it is necessary to assume an observer that could
estimate the system state at time 𝑘 + 1, where the estimated state should be 𝑥̂𝑘+1 . After
assuming an observer, some other information at time 𝑘, will also be needed to derive the

14
Kalman filter. The first information will be the present estimate states 𝑥̂𝑘 , also the current
input 𝑢𝑘 and the current system outputs 𝑦𝑘 should be available. After knowing these three
pieces of information, an observer could be given in (2.2).

𝑥̂𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘 (𝑦𝑘 − 𝑦̂𝑘 )

(2.2)

where 𝑦̂𝑘 is the estimate of the system output given by (2.3),

𝑦̂𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘

(2.3)

𝐾𝑘 is the Kalman gain, which minimizes the variances of the error, and the error is defined
as the residual of the true state and the estimated state, which is given by (2.4)

𝑒𝑘+1 = 𝑥𝑘+1 − 𝑥̂𝑘+1

(2.4)

The estimated value of the unknown states is unbiased (i.e. 𝐸{𝑒𝑘+1 } = 0 ). The error
covariance, which is defined as 𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐸{(𝑒𝑘+1 )(𝑒𝑘+1 )𝑇 }, needs to be found before
getting the Kalman gain, 𝐾𝑘 . While from the definition of the error covariance, some
relationship between system states, system matrices and error covariance could be found.

First, substitute (2.1b) and (2.3) into (2.2), resulting in the estimated state 𝑥̂𝑘+1
expressed below,
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𝑥̂𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘 [(𝐶𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑤𝑘 ) − (𝐶𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘 )]

(2.5𝑎)

Next, the error between the true state 𝑥𝑘+1 and estimated state 𝑥̂𝑘+1 can be
expressed by submitting (2.1a) and (2.5a),

𝑒𝑘+1 = {𝐴𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑣𝑘 } −
{𝐴𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘 [(𝐶𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑤𝑘 ) − (𝐶𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘 )]}

(2.5𝑏)

After some transformation, (2.5b) can be shown as (2.5),

𝑒𝑘+1 = (𝐴𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘 𝐶𝑘 )𝑒𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑣𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘 𝐺𝑘 𝑤𝑘

(2.6)

Substituting (2.5) into the definition of the error covariance yields

𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐸{[(𝐴𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘 𝐶𝑘 )𝑒𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑣𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘 𝐺𝑘 𝑤𝑘 ]
[(𝐴𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘 𝐶𝑘 )𝑒𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑣𝑘 − 𝐾𝑘 𝐺𝑘 𝑤𝑘 ]𝑇 }

(2.7)

After some transformation on (2.7), the error covariance equation can be found as

𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐴𝑇𝑘 − 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 𝐾𝑘𝑇 − 𝐾𝑘 𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐴𝑇𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘 𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 𝐾𝑘𝑇 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑉𝑘 𝐹𝑘𝑇
− 𝐾𝑘 𝐺𝑘 𝑆𝑘𝑇 𝐹𝑘𝑇 − 𝐹𝑘 𝑆𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 𝐾𝑘𝑇 + 𝐾𝑘 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 𝐾𝑘𝑇

(2.8)
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After finding the error covariance equation, it is possible to derive the Kalman gain, 𝐾𝑘 .
During the process of deriving the error covariance 𝑃𝑘+1, there is an important property
that needs to be noticed and that is 𝑃𝑘+1 is a symmetric posite definite matrix. Thus, by
using this property, one can minimize the error covariance to find the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘 ,
and this could be transformed to minimize the trace (𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1 }) of the error covariance
matrix 𝑃𝑘+1 . Therefore, there is a way of getting Kalman gain by taking the partial
derivative of the trace of the error covariance 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1 } with respect to 𝐾𝑘 . After taking
the partial derivative of 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1 }, one can let the partial derivative equation equal zero to
get the expression of the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘 . [17] The equation of the partial derivative of
the trace of the error covariance 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1 } can be expressed as (2.9),

𝛿 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1 }
= −2𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 − 2𝐹𝑘 𝑆𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 + 2𝐾𝑘 (𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )
𝛿 𝐾𝑘

(2.9)

Setting the partial derivative equation (2.9) equal to zero, the Kalman gain could be found
as below,

𝐾𝑘 = (𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑆𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )(𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )−1

(2.10)

As mentioned previously, the Kalman gain minimizes the error covariance in time, so the
error covariance equation (2.8) is simplified after substituting (2.10) into it. Then the
error covariance could be expressed as
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𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐴𝑇𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑉𝑘 𝐹𝑘𝑇 − (𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑆𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )(𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )−1
(𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐴𝑇𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑆𝑘𝑇 𝐹𝑘𝑇 )

(2.11)

If the system state noise and system measurement noise are white noise, which is the
most commonlt the case for most of the system, including the system considered in this
thesis, then their values will be uncorrelated with each other [18] and because the system
state noise and system measurement noise are uncorrelated with each other, the crosscovariance, 𝑆𝑘 , will be zero, then the system state noise vector 𝑣𝑘 , system measurement
noise vector 𝑤𝑘 and the initial state value of the system 𝑥0 are independent white random
variables with arbitrary densities, which could be expressed as below [19]:

𝑋0
𝑥0
𝑥̅0
[ 𝑣𝑘 ] ~ ([ 0 ] , [ 0
𝑤𝑘
0
0

0
𝑉𝑘
0

0
0 ])
𝑊𝑘

(2.12)

The expression of the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘 and the error covariance 𝑃𝑘+1 can be then
simplified as (2.13) and (2.14) if the cross-covariance 𝑆𝑘 = 0,

𝐾𝑘 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 (𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )−1

𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐴𝑇𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑉𝑘 𝐹𝑘𝑇 − 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 (𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )−1 (𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐴𝑇𝑘 )

(2.13)

(2.14)

After finding the expression of the Kalman gain and the error covariance, the state update
equation can be shown as (2.15),
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𝑥̂𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘 𝑦̃𝑘

(2.15)

Where 𝑦̃𝑘 is the innovation term, which is the difference between the system output 𝑦𝑘
and the estimated output 𝑦̂𝑘 at each time 𝑘 and it could be shown below

𝑦̃𝑘 = 𝑦𝑘 − 𝑦̂𝑘
= 𝑦𝑘 − (𝐶𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐷𝑢𝑘 )

(2.16)

From (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15), the recursive algorithm to calculate the system state
estimate is designed. This algorithm works recursively according to the measurement
state at every time step 𝑘 and, because of its recursive nature, the only information that
the Kalman filter needs to know are the current estimate states 𝑥̂𝑘 , the input 𝑢𝑘 and the
measurement states 𝑦𝑘 for calculating the updated estimated value 𝑥̂𝑘+1 . The advantage
of this recursive algorithm is that there is no need to store the past measurements because
it only requires the last “best guess” to do the estimation rather than the entire historical
data.

2.2.2

Kalman Filter Algorithm

As mentioned previously, the Kalman filter is a recursive estimation algorithm,
where it only needs the latest estimate of the states and the measurement states to
calculate the updated state estimate. After deriving the Kalman filter, an introduction will
be shown on how this recursive algorithm works.
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When implementing the Kalman filter algorithm, it is necessary to make sure the
systems matrices 𝐴𝑘 , 𝐵𝑘 , 𝐶𝑘 and 𝐷𝑘 are known and, the value of the measurement noise
covariance 𝑊𝑘 and the value of state noise covariance 𝑉𝑘 are available. After making sure
the systems matrices, the measurement noise covariance and the state noise covariance
are all available, the next step is to assume the value of initial systems state estimate 𝑥̂0
and the initial error covariance 𝑃0 . Basically, 𝑥̂0 and 𝑃0 needs to be set up based on the
situation. For example, if the system’s uncertainty is extremely high, then the initial error
covariance 𝑃0 needs to be set up at a relatively high value, so that the Kalman filter could
work “harder” to decrease the uncertainty of the system [1,18]. Also, the initial state
estimate 𝑥̂0 needs to be set up within a reasonable range so that the Kalman filter could
work properly. Once 𝑥̂0 and 𝑃0 are set up, the next step is to find the Kalman gain 𝐾0
where it could be found by using (2.13). After finding the Kalman gain 𝐾0 , the state
estimate 𝑥̂1 and the error covariance 𝑃1 could be updated with the associated system
measurement 𝑦0 by using (2.14) and (2.15). It could be noticed that the process above
happens at time 𝑘 = 0. The updated 𝑥̂1 and 𝑃1 could be used as the initial value at time
𝑘 = 1 to calculate the new Kalman gain 𝐾1 , after finding the new gain, repeat the process
again until the error covariance 𝑃𝑘 becomes small or the measurement is taken at time 𝑘
[18]. This process could be shown as Fig 2.2 below.

20
Setting up the initial state
estimate 𝐱̂ 𝟎

Setting up the initial error
covariance 𝐏𝟎

𝑥̂0 = 𝐸{𝑥0 }

𝑃0 = 𝐸{(𝑥0 − 𝑥̂0 )(𝑥0 − 𝑥̂0 )𝑇 }

Calculate Kalman gain

k=0

𝐾0 = 𝐴0 𝑃0 𝐶0𝑇 (𝐶0 𝑃0 𝐶0𝑇 + 𝐺0 𝑊0 𝐺0𝑇 )−1

Update state estimate
𝑦0

Update the error covariance
𝑃1 = 𝐴0 𝑃0 𝐴𝑇0 + 𝐹0 𝑉0 𝐹0𝑇
− 𝐴0 𝑃0 𝐶0𝑇 (𝐶0 𝑃0 𝐶0𝑇
+ 𝐺0 𝑊0 𝐺0𝑇 )−1 (𝐶0 𝑃0 𝐴𝑇0 )

𝑥̂1 = 𝐴0 𝑥̂0 + 𝐵0 𝑢0 + 𝐾0 (𝑦0
− [𝐶0 𝑥̂0
+ 𝐷0 𝑢0 ])

Calculate Kalman gain
𝐾1 = 𝐴1 𝑃1 𝐶1𝑇 (𝐶1 𝑃1 𝐶1𝑇 + 𝐺1 𝑊1 𝐺1𝑇 )−1

Update state estimate
𝑦1

k=1

Update the error covariance
𝑃2 = 𝐴1 𝑃1 𝐴1𝑇 + 𝐹1 𝑉1 𝐹1𝑇
− 𝐴1 𝑃1 𝐶1𝑇 (𝐶1 𝑃1 𝐶1𝑇
+ 𝐺1 𝑊1 𝐺1𝑇 )−1 (𝐶1 𝑃1 𝐴1𝑇 )

𝑥̂2 = 𝐴1 𝑥̂1 + 𝐵1 𝑢1 + 𝐾1 (𝑦1 − [𝐶1 𝑥̂1
+ 𝐷1 𝑢1 ])

………
……

After updating
k times

Calculate Kalman gain
𝐾𝑘 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 (𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )−1

………
……

………
……

Update state estimate
𝑦𝑘

𝑥̂𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘 (𝑦𝑘
− [𝐶𝑘 𝑥̂𝑘
+ 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘 ])

Update the error covariance
𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐴𝑇𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑉𝑘 𝐹𝑘𝑇
− 𝐴𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇 (𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐶𝑘𝑇
+ 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇 )−1 (𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘 𝐴𝑇𝑘 )

Figure 2.2: Flowchart of Kalman filter algorithm
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2.3 A Bank of Kalman Filters

When systems matrices 𝐴𝑘 , 𝐵𝑘 , 𝐶𝑘 and 𝐷𝑘 are known and, the value of
measurement noise covariance 𝑊𝑘 and the value of state noise covariance 𝑉𝑘 are
available, it is easy to obtain the state estimate by implementing the Kalman. On the other
hand, the process above would not be so easy when there are some uncertainties in the
system model. For example, consider the sensor intrusion problem, a hacker come into
the system and then modifies the system measurement state by replacing the state signal
𝐶𝑘 𝑒𝑘 with another one, then it will be hard for letting the Kalman filter to obtain the
precise value of the system state estimate even with a large initial error covariance 𝑃𝑘 and
an educated guess of the initial state estimate 𝑥̂0 .

In this technique, the parameter of a system can be adaptively estimated if the
assumptions of the parameter can be made properly. Suppose the unknown parameter
belongs to a discrete set which has known upper and lower bounds, and this set includes
N values where each value is a possible value or a hypothesis for the unknown parameter,
then the set of each possible values or hypothesis could be represented as θ =
{θ1 , θ2 , … , θ𝑖 , … , θ𝑁 }. So, N number of Kalman filters can be designed specifically
corresponding to each possible values of the unknown parameter. After knowing each
possible hypothesis for the unknown parameter, the next step is to calculate the
conditional probabilities for each hypothesis based on the Bayes’ rule and, after that the
specific Kalman filter with a conditional probability that is closest to one represents the
most probable value of the unknown parameter [19, 20].
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2.3.1

Derivation of a bank of Kalman filters

Knowing the possible values of the unknown parameter can be represented as θ =
{θ1 , θ2 , … , θ𝑖 , … , θ𝑁 }, Bayes’ rule can be used as follows

𝑝(θ𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ) =

=

𝑝(𝑌𝑘 , θ𝑖 )
𝑝(𝑌𝑘 )
𝑝(𝑌𝑘 |θ𝑖 )𝑝(θ𝑖 )
𝑁
∑𝑖=1 𝑝(𝑌𝑘 |θ𝑖 )𝑝(θ𝑖 )

(2.17)

Here, 𝑝(θ𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ) represent the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis θ𝑖 and 𝑌𝑘
represents all the system measurements up throuth time instant k. The 𝑝(𝑌𝑘 |θ𝑖 ) are
defined as the likelihood functions for each hypothesis and they are used for the recursive
calculation of a bank of conditional Kalman filters [19]. (2.17) is further expanded and
simplified as

𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ) =

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 , 𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃𝑖 )
𝑝(𝑦𝑘 , 𝑌𝑘−1 )

=

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 , 𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘−1 )𝑝(𝑌𝑘−1 )
𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 )𝑝(𝑌𝑘−1 )

=

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 , 𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘−1 )
𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 )

=

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃𝑖 )𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘−1 )
𝑁
∑𝑖=1 𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃𝑖 )𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘−1 )

(2.18)
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where 𝑦𝑘 represents the system measurement at time 𝑘, 𝑌𝑘−1 represents all system
measurements from 𝑘 = 1 through 𝑘 − 1 and, as mentioned above, 𝜃𝑖 represents the
possible value for the unknown parameter where each Kalman filter is designed
specifically corresponding to each 𝜃𝑖 . This equation can be solved recursively, and the
calculation could begin with an assumed probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌0 ) between 0 and 1 when 𝑘 =
0, where the sum of the probabilities is one. Note that 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘−1 ) is the previous value of
𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ).

After that, the most important step is to calculate 𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃𝑖 ) where it is part of
the probability density function in (2.18). In this work, system state noise and
measurement noise are all assumed to have Gaussian distribution, which produces
Gaussian conditional probabilities. Therefore, 𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃𝑖 ) could be represented as
(2.19) because the density function of Gaussian is known

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃𝑖 ) = (2𝜋)−

1⁄
1 𝑇
𝑚⁄
2 |Ω−1 | 2 exp {− 𝑦
̃𝑘|𝜃𝑖 Ω−1
̃𝑘|𝜃𝑖 }
𝑘|𝜃𝑖
𝑘|𝜃𝑖 𝑦

2

(2.19)

where 𝑚 is the order of the system, 𝑦̃𝑘|𝜃𝑖 is the innovation sequence where each Kalman
filter is responsible for estimation based on its corresponding hypothesis 𝜃𝑖

𝑦̃𝑘|𝜃𝑖 = 𝑦𝑘 − 𝑦̂𝑘|𝑘−1,𝜃𝑖

(2.20)

and Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 is the innovation covariance for each Kalman filter with its corresponding
hypothesis where it could be calculated from below
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Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 = 𝐶𝑘 𝑃𝑘|𝜃𝑖 𝐶𝑘𝑇 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑊𝑘 𝐺𝑘𝑇

(2.21)

Therefore, the conditional probability of each Kalman filter can be found using equation
(2.18), (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21). The convergence will occur when there is a hypothesis
closest to the correct value and that probability will be equal to one for this assumption
while all the probabilities of other possible values of 𝜃𝑖 will go to zero [20].

2.3.2

Algorithm of a bank of Kalman filters

Suppose θ = {θ1 , θ2 , … , θ𝑖 , … , θ𝑁 } where N represents the quantities of possible
values for the unknown parameter, where the upper and lower bounds can be defined as
θ1 and θ𝑁 , which means the possible values of the unknown parameter is included in this
range. After knowing the set of the hypotheses, a bank of Kalman filters is set up where
each Kalman filter is designed specifically with its associated hypothesis and, then 𝑦̃𝑘|𝜃𝑖
and Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 could be calculated by substituting the estimated measurement 𝑦̂𝑘|𝑘−1,𝜃𝑖 and the
error covariance 𝑃𝑘|𝜃𝑖 to equation (2.20) and (2.21). After knowing 𝑦̃𝑘|𝜃𝑖 and Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 for
each possible value of the unknown parameter, the conditional probabilities 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ) can
be calculated recursively using equation (2.18) and the one which is closest to one
represents the true value of the unknown parameter. Fig 2.3 shows the flowchart of the
bank of Kalman filters algorithm.
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Hypothesis 1

Conditional State
Estimates 𝑥̂𝑘|𝜃1

𝜃 = 𝜃1

Hypothesis 2
𝑦𝑘

𝑥̂𝑘|𝜃2
2

Conditional
Probability
Density
Estimates

𝜃 = 𝜃2

𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 )
………
…

Hypothesis N

Hypothesis
Selection
𝜃𝑖
𝑥̂𝑘|𝜃𝑁

𝜃 = 𝜃𝑁

Figure 2.3: Flowchart of a bank of Kalman filters algorithm [19]
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3

SYSTEM MODELING

In this chapter, a first-order and a second-order discrete time-invariant system will
be used separately, and the performance of both systems will be shown. After knowing
both systems’ performance, the constant-type attack signal and the ramp-type attack
signal will enter the systems, replacing the systems’ output to affect the intrusion, so that
the sensor cannot relay the true measurement signal. The performance of both the
affected first-order and second-order system will be shown. The flow chart of the sensor
intrusion process is shown in Fig 3.1

Attack signal
System
input

System

True
measurement

Affected
measurement
Sensor

Figure 3.1: Flowchart of the sensor intrusion process

3.1 Model of the First-Order System

Consider a first-order discrete-time stochastic system with state and measurement
noise

𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑣𝑘

(3.1𝑎)
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𝑦𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑤𝑘

(3.1𝑏)

Where 𝐴𝑘 = 0.9, 𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = 1, 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 𝐹𝑘 = 1, 𝐺𝑘 = 1, and the covariance of the
system state noise 𝑉𝑘 = 0.1, the covariance of the system measurement noise 𝑊𝑘 = 0.05
and both of the system state and measurement noises are zero-mean white and Gaussian.
Therefore, the system can be represented as (3.2a) and (3.2b)

𝑥𝑘+1 = 0.9𝑥𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘

(3.2𝑎)

𝑦𝑘 = 𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(3.2𝑏)

It can be noticed that this system is asymptotically stable from its system matrix 𝐴𝑘 . Fig
3.2 and Fig 3.3 show the system state and system measurement responses with its initial
state 𝑥0 = 2 from 𝑘 = 0 to 200.
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Figure 3.2: The First-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐.
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Figure 3.3: The First-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement response
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐.
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3.2 Attack Model for the First-Order System

3.2.1

Constant-Type Attack Signal

Consider the first-order discrete time-invariant system (3.2a) and (3.2b), where a
hacker affects an intrusion, replacing most of the signal component of the system
measurement by a constant signal ℎ𝑘 at a certain time. Then the model would be
modified as below after hacking happens

𝑥𝑘+1
0.9 0 𝑥𝑘
1
[ℎ ] = [
] [ ] + [ ] 𝑣𝑘
0 1 ℎ𝑘
0
𝑘+1

(3.3𝑎)

𝑥𝑘
𝑦𝑘 = [0.05 1] [ℎ ] + 𝑤𝑘
𝑘

(3.3𝑏)

Here, ℎ𝑘 is a time-invariant constant-type intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 , whose
model is added to the state equation. It can be found that the model is changed with its
associated intrusion signal, where 𝐴𝑘 = [

0.9 0
], 𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [0.05
0 1

1], 𝐷𝑘 = 0,

1
𝐹𝑘 = [ ] and 𝐺𝑘 = 1. While, one can find that the system measurement is not completely
0
replaced by the intrusion signal from 𝐶𝑘 = [0.05 1], there is still some “unhacked”
measurements left, and this is because if the hacker replaces the whole measurement with
a constant-type attack signal ℎ𝑘 , the model would be unobservable and the intrusion
could be detected very easily by the failure of the Kalman filter used in estimating the
state.
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Suppose the intrusion happens at a certain time 𝑘 > 0 when the system is running,
and in this thesis, the time point 𝑘 when intrusion happens is called “shiftpoint”, which
represents that the system is hacked at time 𝑘, and as for hackers, they could select any
shiftpoint to attack the system. Here, three different shiftpoints 𝑘 = 50, 𝑘 = 100 and 𝑘 =
150 are selected arbitrarily to show the changes of model state and measurement when
there is a constant-type attack signal ℎ𝑘 = 10 enters the system

Figure 3.4: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint
𝒌 = 𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.5: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.6: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint
𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.7: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.8: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint
𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.9: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎.
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3.2.2

Step and ramp-type Attack Signal

Consider the first-order discrete time-invariant system (3.2a) and (3.2b), where a
hacker enters the system, replaces most of the signal component of the system
measurement by a step and step and ramp-type signal ℎ𝑘 at a certain time. Then the
system model would be modified as below after hacking happens

𝑥𝑘+1
0.9 0 0 𝑥𝑘
1
1
[ℎ𝑘+1 ] = [ 0 1 1] [ℎ𝑘 ] +
2
ℎ𝑘+1
0 0 1 ℎ𝑘2

𝑦𝑘 = [0.05 1

1
[0] 𝑣𝑘
0

𝑥𝑘
1
1] [ℎ𝑘 ] + 𝑤𝑘
ℎ𝑘2

(3.4a)

(3.4𝑏)

Here, ℎ1𝑘 is a step and ramp-type and ℎ𝑘2 is a step-type hacking signal with the state space
models

ℎ𝑘+1 = [

1
ℎ1𝑘+1
1 1 ℎ𝑘
]
=
[
]
[
]
2
0 1 ℎ𝑘2
ℎ𝑘+1

(3.5)

And this step and ramp-type signal could be shown as Fig 3.10 with its initial value ℎ0 =
[

1
]
0.1
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Figure 3.10: Step and Step and ramp-type intrusion signal with its initial response
𝒉𝟎 = [

𝟏
].
𝟎. 𝟏

also, it can be found that the whole system is changed with its associated intrusion signal,
0.9 0 0
where 𝐴𝑘 = [ 0 1 1], 𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [0.05 1
0 0 1

1
1], 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 𝐹𝑘 = [0] and 𝐺𝑘 = 1.
0

As mentioned above, the system measurement could not be replaced completely by the
intrusion signal from 𝐶𝑘 = [0.05

1 1] because of the unobservability of the system.

There is still some “unhacked” measurement needs to be left to make sure the
modification of the system measurement cannot be detected easily.
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Here, three different shiftpoints 𝑘 = 50, 𝑘 = 100 and 𝑘 = 150 are selected
arbitrarily to show the changes of system state and system measurement when there is a
step and ramp-type attack signal (3.5) enters the system

Figure 3.11: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and ramp-type sensor intrusion happens at
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎.

40

Figure 3.12: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.13: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion happens at
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.14: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.15: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system state response with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion happens at
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.16: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement state
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎.
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3.3 The Second-Order System Model

Consider a second-order discrete-time stochastic system with state and
measurement noise

where 𝐴𝑘 = [

𝑥𝑘+1 = 𝐴𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐵𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐹𝑘 𝑣𝑘

(3.6𝑎)

𝑦𝑘 = 𝐶𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝐷𝑘 𝑢𝑘 + 𝐺𝑘 𝑤𝑘

(3.6𝑏)

0 0.9
], 𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [1
−1 −1

1
1], 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 𝐹𝑘 = [ ], 𝐺𝑘 = 1, and the
0

covariance of the system state noise 𝑣𝑘 = 1, the covariance of the system measurement
noise 𝑤𝑘 = 1 and both of the system state and measurement noises are zero mean, white
and Gaussian. Therefore, the system can be represented as (3.7a) and (3.7b)

𝑥𝑘+1 = [

1
0 0.9
] 𝑥𝑘 + [ ] 𝑣𝑘
0
−1 −1

𝑦𝑘 = [1 1]𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(3.7𝑎)

(3.7𝑏)

It can be noticed that this system is also an asymptotically stable system where the
system’s eigenvalues are −0.5 ± 0.8062i, which are inside the unit circle. Fig 3.10a,
Fig 3.10b and Fig 3.11 show the system state value and system measurement response
2
with the initial state 𝑥0 = [ ] from 𝑘 = 0 to 200.
2
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Figure 3.17: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state 𝒙𝟏 response
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ].
𝟐
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Figure 3.18: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state 𝒙𝟐 response
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ].
𝟐
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Figure 3.19: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement
𝟐
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ].
𝟐
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3.4 Attack Model for the Second-Order System

3.4.1

Constant-Type Attack Signal

Consider the second-order discrete time-invariant system (3.7a) and (3.7b), where
a hacker enters the system, replace most of the signal component of the system
measurement to a constant signal ℎ𝑘 at a certain shiftpoint. Then the system model would
be modified as below after the intrusion happens

1
1
𝑥𝑘+1
0 0.9 0 𝑥𝑘
1
2 ] = [−1 −1 0] [ 2 ] + [0] 𝑣
[𝑥𝑘+1
𝑥𝑘
𝑘
0
0 1 ℎ𝑘
0
ℎ𝑘+1

(3.8𝑎)

𝑦𝑘 = [0 0.1 1]𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(3.8𝑏)

Here, ℎ𝑘 is a time-invariant constant-type intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 , and it can
be found that the whole system is changed with its associated intrusion signal, where
0 0.9 0
𝐴𝑘 = [−1 −1 0], 𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [0
0
0 1

1
0.1 1], 𝐷𝑘 = 0, 𝐹𝑘 = [0] and 𝐺𝑘 = 1. While,
0

it can also be noticed that the system measurement is not replaced completely by the
intrusion signal from 𝐶𝑘 = [0 0.1 1], and that is because if the hacker wants to
replace the whole states into the intrusion signal, then 𝐶𝑘 = [0 0

1] and in this case,

the system would be unobservable. Thus, as mentioned, hackers cannot replace the whole
states completely and they need to leave some “unhacked” measurement to keep the
system observable so that the intrusion could not be found easily.
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Here, three different shiftpoints 𝑘 = 100, 𝑘 = 250 and 𝑘 = 400 are selected
arbitrarily to show the changes of system state and system measurement when there is a
constant-type attack signal ℎ𝑘 = 10 enters the system

Figure 3.20: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at
𝟐
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.21: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at
𝟐
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.22: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement
𝟐
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.23: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at
𝟐
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.24: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at
𝟐
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.25: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement
𝟐
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.26: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at
𝟐
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.27: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at
𝟐
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.28: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement
𝟐
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎.
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3.4.2

Ramp-Type Attack Signal

Consider the second-order discrete time-invariant system (3.7a) and (3.7b), where
a hacker enters the system, replace most of the signal component of the system
measurement to a setp and ramp-type signal ℎ𝑘 at a certain shiftpoint. Then the system
model would be modified as below after the intrusion happens

1
1
𝑥𝑘+1
0 0.9 0 0 𝑥𝑘
2
2
𝑥𝑘+1
−1 −1 0 0 𝑥𝑘
=
[
]
+
0
0 1 1 ℎ1𝑘
ℎ1𝑘+1
2
0
0 0 1 [ℎ2 ]
[ℎ𝑘+1
]
𝑘

𝑦𝑘 = [0

1
0
[0] 𝑣𝑘
0

0.1 1 0]𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(3.9𝑎)

(3.9𝑏)

Here, ℎ𝑘 is a step and ramp-type intrusion signal where it is the same signal as mentioned
in (3.5) and because of the intrusion signal is added into the system, the system matrices
0 0.9 0 0
−1 −1 0 0
are changed, where 𝐴𝑘 = [
], 𝐵𝑘 = 0, 𝐶𝑘 = [0 0.1 1
0
0 1 1
0
0 0 1

0], 𝐷𝑘 = 0,

1
0
𝐹𝑘 = [0] and 𝐺𝑘 = 1. While, as mentioned before, it can be noticed that the system
0
measurement is not replaced completely by the intrusion signal from 𝐶𝑘 =
[0 0.1 1 0], if the hacker wants to replace both states into the intrusion signal, then
𝐶𝑘 = [0

0 1 0] and in this case, the system would be unobservable. Thus, in order
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to make sure the intrusion could not be found easily, hackers still need to leave some
“unhacked” measurement to keep the system be observable.

Here, three different shiftpoints 𝑘 = 100, 𝑘 = 250 and 𝑘 = 400 are selected
arbitrarily to show the changes of system state and system measurement when there is a
step and ramp-type intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system

Figure 3.29: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.30: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.31: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement
𝟐
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor
𝟐
intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.32: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.33: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟐
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.34: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement
𝟐
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor
𝟐
intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.
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Figure 3.35: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.36: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system state response 𝒙𝟏
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion
𝟐
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎.
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Figure 3.37: The Second-Order Discrete-Time Stochastic system measurement
𝟐
response with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] when the Step and Ramp-Type sensor
𝟐
intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟒𝟎𝟎.
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4

DETECTION OF ATTACKS AND CASE STUDIES

In this chapter, the Constant-Type Intrusion Signal and the Ramp-Type Intrusion
Signal targeting the systems mentioned in chapter 3 will be detected by using a bank of
Kalman filters algorithm which is introduced in chapter 2. The estimated value of each
system states and measurements will be shown and the probabilities of the state
(affected/unaffected) of each control system will be calculated as a function of time. The
estimation of the states from a bank of Kalman filters together with the associated
probabilities will also be calculated as a function of time and, by showing the
probabilities of each state (affected/unaffected) based on the data from the bank of
Kalman filters, it’s determined whether the sensor is under attack or not. The
performance of the algorithm will be tested based on various levels of system and
measurement noises. An alternative estimation method (sample mean method) will also
be introduced and the performance of that algorithm will also be shown.

4.1 First-Order System with Constant-Type Intrusion Signal

Consider the first-order system mentioned in chapter 3, where the system is
shown as (4.1a) and (4.1b),
𝑥𝑘+1 = 0.9𝑥𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘

(4.1𝑎)

𝑦𝑘1 = 𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(4.1𝑏)

70
where 𝐴1 = 0.9, 𝐵1 = 0, 𝐶 1 = 1, 𝐷1 = 0, 𝐹1 = 1, 𝐺 1 = 1, and the covariance of the
system state noise 𝑉 = 0.1, the covariance of the system measurement noise 𝑊 = 0.05
and both system state noise and system measurement noise are Gaussian. Note that the
superscript 1 represents the system is currently not under attack.

Before estimating system state and measurement, the observability of this firstorder system needs to be checked and it could be checked easily by using the system
matrices 𝐴1 and 𝐶 1 with the observability criteria, which shows the system is observable.

Then, the system estimated state and measurement can be observed using the
Kalman Filter by setting up the system’s initial state estimate 𝑥̂0 and initial error
covariance 𝑃01 based on system’s uncertainty. According to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and
(2.13), the Kalman Filter can be expressed as below

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

−1

𝑇

1
𝑃𝑘+1
= 𝐴1 𝑃𝑘1 𝐴1 + 𝐹1 𝑉𝐹1 − 𝐴1 𝑃𝑘1 𝐶 1 (𝐶 1 𝑃𝑘1 𝐶 1 + 𝐺 1 𝑊𝐺 1 ) (𝐶 1 𝑃𝑘1 𝐴1 ) (4.2)

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

𝐾𝑘1 = 𝐴1 𝑃𝑘1 𝐶 1 (𝐶 1 𝑃𝑘1 𝐶 1 + 𝐺 1 𝑊𝐺 1 )

−1

(4.3)

𝑥̂𝑘+1 = 𝐴1 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘1 𝑦̃𝑘1

(4.4)

𝑦̃𝑘1 = 𝑦𝑘1 − 𝐶 1 𝑥̂𝑘

(4.5)
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Here, the system measurement estimate is defined as

𝑦̂𝑘1 = 𝐶 1 𝑥̂𝑘

(4.6)

The attack model of this first-order system can be known from (3.3a) and (3.3b)

𝑥𝑘+1
0.9 0 𝑥𝑘
1
[ℎ ] = [
] [ ] + [ ] 𝑣𝑘
0 1 ℎ𝑘
0
𝑘+1

(4.7𝑎)

𝑥𝑘
𝑦𝑘2 = [0.05 1] [ℎ ] + 𝑤𝑘
𝑘

(4.7𝑏)

From the previous chapter, it could be known that ℎ𝑘 is a constant-type intrusion signal
where ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 = 10, and it can be found that the whole system is changed to a
second-order system with its associated intrusion signal, where 𝐴2 = [
𝐶 2 = [0.05

0.9 0
], 𝐵 2 = 0,
0 1

1
1], 𝐷2 = 0, 𝐹 2 = [ ] and 𝐺 2 = 1. Note that superscript 2 represents the
0

system is currently under attack.

Similarly, the observability of this second-order attack model needs to be
checked, by submitting 𝐴2 and 𝐶 2 into 𝑂2 , where

𝑂2 = [

𝐶2
0.05
]= [
𝐶2 𝐴2
0.045

1
]
1
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Here, 𝑂2 represents the observability matrix for this second-order attack model
and it can be known that 𝑂2 is full rank, which shows the system is observable.

Knowing the observability of this attack model, the estimated state and
measurement of this second-order system can be estimated using the Kalman Filter by
setting up the system’s initial state estimate 𝑥̂0 , initial value of the intrusion signal
estimate ℎ0 and initial error covariance 𝑃02 based on this system state’s uncertainty.
According to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13), the Kalman Filter can be expressed as
below

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

−1

𝑇

2
𝑃𝑘+1
= 𝐴2 𝑃𝑘2 𝐴2 + 𝐹 2 𝑉𝐹 2 − 𝐴2 𝑃𝑘2 𝐶 2 (𝐶 2 𝑃𝑘2 𝐶 2 + 𝐺 2 𝑊𝐺 2 ) (𝐶 2 𝑃𝑘2 𝐴2 ) (4.8)

𝑇

𝑇

𝑇

𝐾𝑘2 = 𝐴2 𝑃𝑘2 𝐶 2 (𝐶 2 𝑃𝑘2 𝐶 2 + 𝐺 2 𝑊𝐺 2 )

−1

(4.9)

𝑥̂𝑘+1 = 𝐴2 𝑥̂𝑘 + 𝐾𝑘2 𝑦̃𝑘2

(4.10)

𝑦̃𝑘2 = 𝑦𝑘2 − 𝐶 2 𝑥̂𝑘

(4.11)

Here, the system measurement estimate could also be known form above, where

𝑦̂𝑘2 = 𝐶 2 𝑥̂𝑘

(4.12)
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After calculating both system measurement estimates 𝑦̂𝑘1 and 𝑦̂𝑘2 system innovation
terms 𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 , the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis θ𝑖 could also be found.
Note that θ = {θ1 , θ2 }, where θ1 represents the hypothesis when the system is not under
attack and θ2 represents the system is under attack. According (2.15), (2.16), (2.17) and
(2.18), the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ) could be found.

From the chapter 2, the first step of getting 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ) is to calculate each
covariance for each Kalman Filter with its corresponding hypothesis Ω𝑘|𝜃𝑖 , where

𝑇

𝑇

Ω𝑘|𝜃1 = 𝐶 1 𝑃𝑘|𝜃1 𝐶 1 + 𝐺 1 𝑊𝐺 1

(4.13)

Here, Ω𝑘|𝜃1 represents the covariance for the hypothesis θ1 , where the system is
currently not under attack and 𝑃𝑘|𝜃1 = 𝑃𝑘1 . Thus, Ω𝑘|𝜃1 could be calculated by
submitting system matrices 𝐶1 , 𝐺1 , system measurement noise 𝑊 and system error
covariance 𝑃𝑘1 from (4.2).

Similarly, Ω𝑘|𝜃2 represents the covariance for the hypothesis θ2 , where the system
is currently under attack and 𝑃𝑘|𝜃2 = 𝑃𝑘2 . Thus, Ω𝑘|𝜃2 could be calculated by submitting
system matrices 𝐶2 , 𝐺2 , system measurement noise W and system error covariance 𝑃𝑘2
from (4.8). and Ω𝑘|𝜃2 could be shown as below

𝑇

𝑇

Ω𝑘|𝜃2 = 𝐶 2 𝑃𝑘|𝜃2 𝐶 2 + 𝐺 2 𝑊𝐺 2

(4.14)
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After calculating Ω𝑘|𝜃1 and Ω𝑘|𝜃2 , the second step of getting 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ) is to
calculate the likelihood function 𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃𝑖 ), where it is part of the probability density
function in (2.15) and it could be known from (2.16) by submitting Ω𝑘|𝜃1 , Ω𝑘|𝜃2 , 𝑦̃𝑘|𝜃1 ,
and 𝑦̃𝑘|𝜃2 . Note that 𝑦̃𝑘|𝜃1 = 𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘|𝜃2 = 𝑦̃𝑘2 ,.

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃1 ) = (2𝜋)−

1⁄
1 𝑇
𝑚⁄
2 |Ω−1 | 2 exp {− 𝑦
̃𝑘|𝜃1 Ω−1
̃𝑘|𝜃1 }
𝑘|𝜃1
𝑘|𝜃1 𝑦

(4.15)

1⁄
1 𝑇
𝑚⁄
2 |Ω−1 | 2 exp {− 𝑦
̃𝑘|𝜃2 Ω−1
̃𝑘|𝜃2 }
𝑘|𝜃2
𝑘|𝜃2 𝑦

(4.16)

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃2 ) = (2𝜋)−

2

2

In (4.15), 𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃1 ) represents the likelihood function when the system is
not under attack, and 𝑚 = 1 because the unhacked system is a first order system as
mentioned in (4.1a) and (4.1b). Similarly, 𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃2 ) represents the likelihood
function in (4.16) when the system is under attack, and 𝑚 = 2 because when the system
is under attack, it will become a second order system mentioned in (4.7a) and (4.7b) with
its associate constant-type intrusion signal.

After calculating the likelihood function for both cases (hacked/ not hacked), the
conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ) could be found by submitting (4.15)
and (4.16) to (2.15) separately, where
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𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) =

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃1 )𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘−1 )
𝑁
∑𝑖=1 𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃1 )𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘−1 )

(4.17)

𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) =

𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃2 )𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘−1 )
∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑝(𝑦𝑘 |𝑌𝑘−1 , 𝜃2 )𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘−1 )

(4.18)

Here, (4.17) and (4.18) can be solved recursively, and the calculation would begin with
an initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌0 ) between 0 and 1 when 𝑘 = 0, note that 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘−1 ) is the
previous value of 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌𝑘 ).

The simulation results can be shown by submitting the two systems
(hacked/unhacked) matrices into a bank of Kalman Filters and Fig. 4.1 shows the changes
of the system measurement before and after it’s being hacked.
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Figure 4.1: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement y with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint
𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.

As mentioned, before the constant-type intrusion signal enters this first-order
system, the system measurement is 𝑦𝑘1 = 𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘 like what Fig 4.1 shows before 𝑘 =
100. After that, the intrusion signal replaces the system measurement so that 𝑦𝑘2 =
[0.05

𝑥𝑘
1] [ℎ ] + 𝑤𝑘 like what Fig 4.1 shows after 𝑘 = 100.
𝑘

After showing the system measurement, the next step is to calculate the system
state and measurement estimate by using a bank of Kalman Filters. By submitting (4.2),
(4.3), (4.4) and (4.6) to (4.5) with its initial state estimate 𝑥̂0 = 1 and initial error
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covariance 𝑃01 = 100, the innovation term 𝑦̃𝑘1 could be calculated. Similarly, by
𝑥̂0
submitting (4.8), (4.9), (4.10) and (4.12) to (4.11) with its initial state estimate [ ̂ ] =
ℎ0
0
100
[ ] and initial error covariance 𝑃02 = [
0
0

0
], the innovation term 𝑦̃𝑘2 could also be
100

calculated. Fig 4.2 shows the innovation terms 𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 in time

̃𝟏𝒌 and 𝒚
̃𝟐𝒌 when there is a constant-type intrusion
Figure 4.2: The innovation terms 𝒚
signal at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎

After finding the innovation term 𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 , the likelihood function (4.15) and
(4.16) could be calculated and the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 )
and 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) could be found by submitting the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) to
(2.15) separately and by setting up both the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌0 ) = 0.5 and
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𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌0 ) = 0.5 when 𝑘 = 0, the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis can be
shown as Fig 4.3, note that the intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100

Figure 4.3: Conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝒑(𝜽𝟏 |𝒀𝒌 ) (unhacked case)
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐 |𝒀𝒌 ) (hacked case) when there is a constant-type intrusion signal enters the
system at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎, starting with each initial probability 𝒑(𝜽𝟏 |𝒀𝟎 ) = 𝟎. 𝟓
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐 |𝒀𝟎 ) = 𝟎. 𝟓

From Fig 4.3, it could be noticed that both the hacked and unhacked cases are all
start with the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌0) = 0.5. The conditional probability for the
unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences to 1 very quickly and keeps convergence until the
shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case
𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 =
100, which means that the system is not under attack when 𝑘 < 100. When the shiftpoint
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𝑘 = 100, which represents the system measurement is now replaced by the constant-type
intrusion signal and now the conditional probability for the unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 )
convergences to 0 from 1 very quickly and keeps convergence when the shiftpoint 𝑘 >
100, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 )
convergences to 1 form 0 very quickly and keeps convergence when the shiftpoint 𝑘 >
100, which means that the system is now under attack when 𝑘 > 100. Note that the
convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 when 𝑘 < 100 is 𝑘 = 2, and the convergence time
for 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 when 𝑘 > 100 is 𝑘 = 102, which means the algorithm designed in this
thesis works very well under this condition.

4.2 First-Order System with Ramp-Type Intrusion Signal

Consider the first-order system (4.1a) and (4.1b), where the hacker enters the
system, replace the system measurement to a step and ramp-type intrusion signal and in
this case, the attack model of this first-order system can be known from (3.4a) and (3.4b)
and it could be shown below

𝑥𝑘+1
0.9 0 0 𝑥𝑘
1
1
1
[ℎ𝑘+1 ] = [ 0 1 1] [ℎ𝑘 ] + [0] 𝑣𝑘
2
ℎ𝑘+1
0 0 1 ℎ𝑘2
0

𝑦𝑘2

= [0.05 1

𝑥𝑘
1
1] [ℎ𝑘 ] + 𝑤𝑘
ℎ𝑘2

(4.19a)

(4.19𝑏)
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From the previous chapter, it could be known that ℎ𝑘 is now a ramp-type
intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘+1

1
ℎ1𝑘+1
1 1 ℎ𝑘
=[ 2 ]= [
] [ ], and it can be found that the whole
0 1 ℎ𝑘2
ℎ𝑘+1

system is changed to a third-order system with its associated intrusion signal, where 𝐴2 =
0.9 0
[0 1
0 0

0
1], 𝐵 2 = 0, 𝐶 2 = [0.05 1
1

1
1], 𝐷2 = 0, 𝐹 2 = [0] and 𝐺 2 = 1. Similarly,
0

superscript 2 represents the system is currently under attack, and the intrusion signal is
now a ramp-type signal. Fig 4.4 shows the changes of the system measurement y when
the step and ramp-type sensor intrusion happened at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100.

Figure 4.4: The First-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement y with its
initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Step and Ramp-Type sensor intrusion happens at
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.
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As usual, the observability of this third-order system needs to be checked by
submitting 𝐴2 and 𝐶 2 into 𝑂2 , where

𝐶2
0.05
2
2
2
𝑂 = [ 𝐶 𝐴 ] = [ 0.045
2
0.0405
𝐶 2 𝐴2

1 1
1 2]
1 3

Here, 𝑂2 represents the observability matrix for this third-order attack model and
it can be known that 𝑂2 is full rank, which shows the system is observable.

Similarly, after knowing the system’s observability, this third order system
estimated state and measurement can be observed using the Kalman Filter by setting up
the system’s initial state estimate 𝑥̂0 , initial intrusion signal estimate ℎ̂0 and initial error
covariance 𝑃02 based on the system’s uncertainty. According to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and
(2.13), the system state estimate and measurement estimate could be calculated and after
that, the system innovation terms 𝑦̃𝑘2 can also be calculated with its initial state estimate
𝑥̂0
0.1
7 0
[ℎ̂10 ] = [ 0 ] and initial error covariance 𝑃02 = [0 7
0
0 0
ℎ̂02

0
0].
7

Fig 4.5 shows the innovation terms 𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 in time, note that the intrusion is the ramptype signal now
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̃𝟏𝒌 and 𝒚
̃𝟐𝒌 when there is a step and ramp-type
Figure 4.5: The innovation terms 𝒚
intrusion signal at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎

Similar to the constant-type intrusion cases, after finding the innovation term
𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 , the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) can be calculated and the conditional
probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) and 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) can be found by submitting the
likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) to (2.15) separately and by setting up both the initial
probability 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌0 ) = 0.5 and 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌0 ) = 0.5 when 𝑘 = 0, the conditional probabilities
of each hypothesis can be shown as Fig 4.6, note that the intrusion is the step and ramptype signal and the intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100

83

Figure 4.6: Conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝒑(𝜽𝟏 |𝒀𝒌 ) (unhacked case)
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐 |𝒀𝒌 ) (hacked case) when there is a step and ramp-type intrusion signal
enters the system at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎, starting with each initial probability
𝒑(𝜽𝟏 |𝒀𝟎 ) = 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐 |𝒀𝟎 ) = 𝟎. 𝟓

From Fig 4.6, it can be noticed that both the hacked and unhacked cases are all
start with the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌0) = 0.5. The conditional probability for the
unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences to 1 very quickly and keeps convergence until the
shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case
𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 =
100, which means that the system is not under attack when 𝑘 < 100. When the shiftpoint
𝑘 = 100, which represents the system measurement is now replaced by the step and
ramp-type intrusion signal and now the conditional probability for the unhacked case
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𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences from 1 to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence when the
shiftpoint 𝑘 > 100, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case
𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences from 0 to 1 very quickly and also keeps convergence, which
means the system is now under attack when 𝑘 > 100. Note that the convergence time for
𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 when 𝑘 < 100 is 𝑘 = 9, and the convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 when
𝑘 > 100 is 𝑘 = 102, which shows this estimation algorithm designed in this thesis works
also well under this step and ramp-type intrusion condition.

4.3 Second-Order System with Constant-Type Intrusion Signal

Consider the second-order system mentioned in chapter 3, where the system is
shown as (4.20a) and (4.20b),

𝑥𝑘+1 = [

1
0 0.9
] 𝑥𝑘 + [ ] 𝑣𝑘
0
−1 −1

𝑦𝑘1 = [1 1]𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

0
where 𝐴1 = [
−1

0.9
], 𝐵1 = 0, 𝐶 1 = [1
−1

(4.20𝑎)

(4.20𝑏)

1
1], 𝐷1 = 0, 𝐹1 = [ ], 𝐺 1 = 1, and the
0

covariance of the system state noise 𝑉 = 1, the covariance of the system measurement
noise W = 1 and both system state noise and system measurement noise are Gaussian
and by using the observability criteria, the observability of the system could be checked
by submitting 𝐴1 and 𝐶 1 into 𝑂1
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1
1
1
𝑂1 = [ 𝐶1 1 ] = [
]
−1 −0.1
𝐶 𝐴

Here, 𝑂1 represents the observability matrix for this second-order system and it can be
known that 𝑂1 is full rank, which shows the system is observable.

In the same time, the attack model of this second-order system can be known
from (3.8a) and (3.8b)
1
1
𝑥𝑘+1
0 0.9 0 𝑥𝑘
1
2 ] = [−1 −1 0] [ 2 ] + [0] 𝑣
[𝑥𝑘+1
𝑥𝑘
𝑘
0
0 1 ℎ𝑘
0
ℎ𝑘+1

(4.21𝑎)

𝑦𝑘2 = [0 0.1 1]𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(4.21𝑏)

Here, ℎ𝑘 is a constant-type intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 = 10, and it can be found
that the whole system is changed to a third-order system with its associated intrusion
0 0.9 0
signal, where 𝐴 = [−1 −1 0], 𝐵 2 = 0, 𝐶 2 = [0
0
0 1
2

1
0.1 1], 𝐷 = 0, 𝐹 = [0] and
0
2

2

𝐺 2 = 1.

Same as mentioned before, the observability of this third-order system needs to be
checked by submitting 𝐴2 and 𝐶 2 into 𝑂2
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𝐶2
0
0.1 1
2
2
2
𝑂 = [ 𝐶 𝐶 ] = [−0.1 −0.1 1]
2
0.1 0.01 1
𝐶 2 𝐴2

Here, 𝑂2 represents the observability matrix for this third-order attack model and it can
be known that 𝑂2 is full rank, which shows the system is observable. Fig 4.7 shows the
system measurement y when the constant-type sensor intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝑘 =
250.

Figure 4.7: The Second-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement y with
its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [𝟐 𝟐] and the Constant-Type sensor intrusion happens at
shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.
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Before the constant-type intrusion signal enters the system, the system
measurement is 𝑦𝑘1 = [1 1]𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘 like Fig 4.7 shows before 𝑘 = 250. After that, the
intrusion signal replaces the system measurement so that 𝑦𝑘2 = [0

0.1 1]𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

like Fig 4.7 shows after 𝑘 = 250.

After knowing the system measurement, the next step is to calculate the system
state and measurement estimate by using a bank of Kalman Filters. By submitting (4.2),
0
(4.3) and (4.4) to (4.5) and (4.5) with its initial state estimate 𝑥̂0 = [ ] and initial error
0
100
covariance 𝑃01 = [
0

0
], the system measurement estimate 𝑦̂𝑘1 and the innovation
100

term 𝑦̃𝑘1 can be calculated. Similarly, by submitting (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10) to (4.11) and
0
𝑥̂0
(4.12) with its initial state estimate [ ̂ ] = [0] and initial error covariance 𝑃02 =
ℎ0
0
100
[ 0
0

0
100
0

0
0 ], the system measurement estimate 𝑦̂𝑘2 and the innovation term 𝑦̃𝑘2 can
100

also be calculated. Fig 4.8 shows the innovation terms 𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 in time
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̃𝟏𝒌 and 𝒚
̃𝟐𝒌 for the second-order system when there
Figure 4.8: The innovation terms 𝒚
is a constant-type intrusion signal at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.

Like the first-order cases introduced previously in this chapter, after finding the
innovation term 𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 , the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) can be calculated
and the conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) and 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) can be found
by submitting the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) to (2.15) separately and by setting
up both the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌0 ) = 0.5 and 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌0 ) = 0.5 when 𝑘 = 0, the
conditional probabilities of each hypothesis can be shown as Fig 4.9, note that the
intrusion happens at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 250
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Figure 4.9: Conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝒑(𝜽𝟏 |𝒀𝒌 ) (unhacked case)
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐 |𝒀𝒌 ) (hacked case) when there is a constant-type intrusion signal enters the
second-order system at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎, starting with each initial probability
𝒑(𝜽𝟏 |𝒀𝟎 ) = 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐 |𝒀𝟎 ) = 𝟎. 𝟓

From Fig 4.9, it can be noticed that both the hacked and unhacked cases are all
start with the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌0) = 0.5. The conditional probability for the
unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences to 1 very quickly and keeps convergence until the
shiftpoint 𝑘 = 250, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case
𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 =
250, which means that the system is not under attack when 𝑘 < 250. When the shiftpoint
𝑘 = 250, which represents the system measurement is now replaced by the constant-type
intrusion signal and now the conditional probability for the unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 )
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convergences from 1 to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence when the shiftpoint 𝑘 >
250, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 )
convergences from 0 to 1 very quickly and also keeps convergence, which means the
system is now under attack when 𝑘 > 250. Note that the convergence time for
𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 when 𝑘 < 250 is 𝑘 = 3, and the convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 when
𝑘 > 250 is 𝑘 = 264, which shows this estimation algorithm could also works well for
the second-order system when there is a constant-type intrusion enters the system.

4.4 Second-Order System with Step and ramp-type Intrusion Signal

Consider the second-order system (4.20a) and (4.20b), where the hacker enters the
system, replace the system measurement to a step and ramp-type intrusion signal and in
this case, the attack model of this second-order system can be known from (3.9a) and
(3.9b) and it could be shown below

1
1
𝑥𝑘+1
0 0.9 0 0 𝑥𝑘
2
2
𝑥𝑘+1
−1 −1 0 0 𝑥𝑘
=
[
]
+
0
0 1 1 ℎ1𝑘
ℎ1𝑘+1
2
0
0 0 1 [ℎ2 ]
[ℎ𝑘+1
]
𝑘

𝑦𝑘2 = [0

1
0
[0] 𝑣𝑘
0

0.1 1 0]𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(3.9𝑎)

(3.9𝑏)

From the previous chapter, it could be known that ℎ𝑘 is a step and ramp-type
1
ℎ1
1 1 ℎ𝑘
intrusion signal where ℎ𝑘+1 = [ 𝑘+1
]
=
[
]
[
], and it can be found that the whole
2
0 1 ℎ𝑘2
ℎ𝑘+1
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system is changed to a fourth-order system with its associated intrusion signal, where
0 0.9 0
−1
−1 0
𝐴2 = [
0
0 1
0
0 0

0
1
0
0
], 𝐵 2 = 0, 𝐶 2 = [0 0.1 1 0], 𝐷2 = 0, 𝐹 2 = [0] and 𝐺 2 =
1
0
1

1. Similarly, superscript 2 represents the system is currently under attack, and the
intrusion signal is now a step and ramp-type signal. Fig 4.10 shows the system
measurement y when the step and ramp-type sensor intrusion happened at shiftpoint 𝑘 =
250.

Figure 4.10: The Second-Order Discrete-Time stochastic system measurement y
𝟐
with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = [ ] and the Step and ramp-type sensor intrusion happens
𝟐
at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎.
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Same as mentioned before, the observability of this fourth-order system needs to
be checked by submitting 𝐴2 and 𝐶 2 into 𝑂2

𝐶2
0
0.1 1
2 2
𝐶 𝐴
−0.1 −0.1 1
𝑂2 = [ 2 22 ] = [
0.1
0.01 1
𝐶 𝐴
2 23
−0.01 0.08 1
𝐶 𝐴

0
1
]
2
3

Here, 𝑂2 represents the observability matrix for this fourth-order attack model and it can
be known that 𝑂2 is a full rank fourth-order matrix, which shows the system is
observable.

Knowing the system’s observability, this fourth-order system estimated state and
measurement can be monitored using the Kalman Filter by setting up the system’s initial
state estimate 𝑥̂0, initial intrusion signal estimate ℎ̂0 and initial error covariance 𝑃02 based
on the system state uncertainty. According to (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13), the system
state estimate and measurement estimate can be calculated and after that, the system
0
𝑥
̂
0
0
innovation terms 𝑦̃𝑘2 can also be calculated with its initial state estimate [ ̂ ] = [0] and
ℎ0
0
100
0
initial error covariance 𝑃02 = [
0
0
terms 𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 in time

0
100
0
0

0
0
100
0

0
0
]. Fig 4.5 shows the innovation
0
100
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̃𝟏𝒌 and 𝒚
̃𝟐𝒌 for the second-order system when there
Figure 4.11: The innovation terms𝒚
is a step and ramp-type intrusion signal at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎

Similar with the constant-type intrusion cases, after finding the innovation term
𝑦̃𝑘1 and 𝑦̃𝑘2 , the likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) can be calculated and the conditional
probabilities of each hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) and 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) can be found by submitting the
likelihood function (4.15) and (4.16) to (2.15) separately and by setting up both the initial
probability 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌0 ) = 0.5 and 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌0 ) = 0.5 when 𝑘 = 0, the conditional probabilities
of each hypothesis can be shown as Fig 4.12, note that the intrusion happens at shiftpoint
𝑘 = 250
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Figure 4.12: Conditional probabilities of each hypothesis 𝒑(𝜽𝟏 |𝒀𝒌 ) (unhacked case)
and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐 |𝒀𝒌 ) (hacked case) when there is a step and ramp-type intrusion signal
enters the second-order system at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎, starting with each initial
probability 𝒑(𝜽𝟏 |𝒀𝟎 ) = 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝒑(𝜽𝟐 |𝒀𝟎 ) = 𝟎. 𝟓

From Fig 4.12, it can be noticed that both the hacked and unhacked cases are all
start with the initial probability 𝑝(𝜃𝑖 |𝑌0) = 0.5. The conditional probability for the
unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences to 1 very quickly and keeps convergence until the
shiftpoint 𝑘 = 250, and on the other hand, the conditional probability for the hacked case
𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences to 0 very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 =
250, which means that the system is not under attack when 𝑘 < 250. When the shiftpoint
𝑘 = 250, the system measurement is replaced by the constant-type intrusion signal and
the conditional probability for the unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences from 1 to 0 very
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fast and keeps convergence when the shiftpoint 𝑘 > 250, and on the other hand, the
conditional probability for the hacked case 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences from 0 to 1 very fast
and also keeps convergence, which means the system is now under attack when 𝑘 > 250.
Note that the convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 when 𝑘 < 250 is 𝑘 = 5, and the
convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 when 𝑘 > 250 is 𝑘 = 255, which shows this
estimation algorithm could also work for the second-order system when there is a step
and ramp-type intrusion enters the system.

4.5 Analysis of Simulation Results

Considering the four cases mentioned above, the algorithm using a bank of
Kalman filters in this thesis can detect the intrusion signal when it enters the system
measurement based on the intrusion model considered. For example, when a constanttype signal enters the second-order system mentioned in section 4.3, The conditional
probability for the hypothesis 1, which is the unhacked case 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ), convergences to 1
very quickly and keeps convergence until the shiftpoint 𝑘 = 250 when there is no
intrusion signal enters the system, note that the convergence time for 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 1 is
𝑘 = 3 and the probability for the hacked case 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) = 0 . When 𝑘 > 250, the
probability of the hacked hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) convergences from 0 to 1 with the
convergence time 𝑘 = 264. Note that the shorter convergence time the better it will be,
especially for the convergence time when the hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) (hacking happens)
convergences from 0 to 1. Since the different signal to noise ratios could influence the
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convergence time, it is necessary to do some analysis between the system signal to noise
ratio (SNR) and the convergence time. Here, the SNR is given as below

SNR =

𝐶𝐶 𝑇 𝑡𝑟(𝑋∞ )
𝑊

(4.22)

Where
𝑋∞ = 𝐴𝑋∞ 𝐴𝑇 + 𝐹𝑉𝐹 𝑇

From (4.22) it can be found that the system SNR increases by increasing the value of
system state noise covariance 𝑉 or decreasing the value of 𝑊. Here, Table 4.1 shows the
changes of the convergence time for unhacked case for 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 ) to converge to one
before the intrusion happens as a function of time the covariance of the system state noise
𝑉.

Table 4.1: Changes of the convergence time for the second-order system with
constant-type intrusion signal when increasing the SNR from 3 to 30
V
0.1
0.5
1
2
3
4
5

𝑊
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SNR
2.8352
14.1762
28.3525
56.7050
85.0575
113.4100
141.7625

Convergence Time
3
3
4
5
5
5
5

From Table 4.1, it can be noted that the changes of the system state noise can barely
influence the convergence time for the probability of the hypothesis for 𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑌𝑘 )
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converge to one before the intrusion happens. While if the system output is replaced by
the intrusion signal, the SNR is presented as below

SNR =

𝑑2
𝑊

(4.23)

where 𝑑 is the intrusion signal and in section 4.3 𝑑 = ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 which is a constanttype intrusion signal and it could be noticed that the value of 𝑑 could influence the value
of SNR from (4.23). Here, Table 4.2 shows the changes of the convergence time of the
hypothesis 𝑝(𝜃2 |𝑌𝑘 ) to one after the intrusion happens as a function of time the SNR
from 3 to 30.

Table 4.2: Changes of the convergence time for the second-order system with
constant-type intrusion signal when increasing the SNR from 3 to 30
d
3
5
10
15
20
25
30

𝑊
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SNR
9
25
100
225
400
625
900

Convergence Time
369
278
266
257
254
254
254

From Table 4.2, it can be noted that increasing the SNR of the system can lead to a
shorter detection time of intrusion. This might imply that might because the larger SNR
could lead to the bank of Kalman filters working faster. However, it is necessary to do
some study regarding the relationship between the SNR and the convergence time.
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4.6 An Alternative Detection Algorithm for the Intrusion Problem

In this section, an alternative detection method is where the computed throretical
mean value of the system measurement is compared to the actual value of the
measurement.

Consider the first-order system

𝑥𝑘+1 = 0.9𝑥𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘

(4.24𝑎)

𝑦𝑘1 = 3𝑥𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(4.24𝑏)

where A = 0.9, B = 0, C = 3, D = 0, F = 1, G = 1, and the covariance of the system
state noise 𝑉 = 0.01, the covariance of the system measurement noise 𝑊 = 0.01 and
both system state noise and system measurement noises are aero mean and Gaussian.
Note that this system’s eigenvalue is inside the unit circle and the superscript 1 represents
the system is currently not under attack. After the shiftppoint 𝑘 = 100, there is a
constant-type intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 enters the system and replaces the system
measurement and in this case, the system measurement becomes

𝑦𝑘2 = ℎ𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

and the system state and measurement could be shown as Fig 4.13

(4.25)
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Figure 4.13: The first-order Discrete-Time stochastic system state 𝒙𝒌 and
measurement 𝒚𝒌 with its initial state 𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Constant-Type sensor
intrusion 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.

The sample mean value of the system measurement 𝑦̅𝑘 can be approximately
found using the sample mean method by setting up the initial state’s mean value 𝑥̅0 . If
there is a control signal 𝑢𝑘 , then we have

𝑘−1

𝑦̅𝑘 = 𝐶𝐴𝑘 𝑥̅0 + 𝐶 ∑ 𝐴𝑘−𝑖−1 𝐵𝑢𝑖
𝑖=0

Since there is no control signal in this system, (4.26) could be simplified as below

(4.26)
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𝑦̅𝑘 = 𝐶𝐴𝑘 𝑥̅0

(4.27)

And the sample mean value of the system measurement could be shown as Fig 4.14.

Figure 4.14: The first-order Discrete-Time stochastic system sample mean value of
̅𝒌 with its initial mean value of the system state 𝒙
̅𝟎 = 𝟐
the system measurement 𝒚
and the Constant-Type sensor intrusion signal 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 =
𝟏𝟎𝟎.

After calculating the sample mean value of the system measurement 𝑦̅𝑘 , the
sample mean detection algorithm can be expressed as Fig 4.15
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𝑥̅0
System
input
Discrete-time
stochastic system

𝑦̅𝑘

Sample
mean
method
𝑦𝑘

ℎ𝑘
sensor

Compare 𝑦̅𝑘
and system
measurement

System is
affected
or not
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Figure 4.15: Flowchart of the sample mean detection algorithm

As mentioned in Fig 4.15, there is a comparison between the system measurement
and the theoretical sample mean value of the system measurement, and it is defined as
𝑦̃𝑘 = 𝑦𝑘 − 𝑦̅𝑘 . Before the intrusion enters the system, the value of 𝑦̃𝑘 should be close to
zero because the value of 𝑦̅𝑘 is the computed mean value of 𝑦𝑘 at each time step k. After
the intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system and replaces the system measurement, the
comparison becomes 𝑦̃𝑘 = ℎ𝑘 − 𝑦̅𝑘 , which would not be close to zero because 𝑦̅𝑘 is no
longer the intrusion signal’s mean value. Fig 4.16 shows the value of 𝑦̃𝑘 when the
constant-type intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system at the shiftpiont 𝑘 = 100.
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̃𝒌 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐
Figure 4.16: The value of 𝒚
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.

From Fig 4.16, changes of 𝑦̃𝑘 show that there is a constant-type intrusion signal
ℎ𝑘 enters the system at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100 and changes the system measurement.

Consider the first-order system with a control signal 𝑢𝑘

𝑥𝑘+1 = 0.9𝑥𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘

(4.28𝑎)

𝑦𝑘1 = 2𝑥𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

(4.28𝑏)
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where A = 0.9, B = 0, C = 2, D = 0, F = 1, G = 1, the constant-type control signal
𝑢𝑘 = 1, and the covariance of the system state noise 𝑉 = 0.01, the covariance of the
system measurement noise 𝑊 = 0.01 and both system state noise and system
measurement noises are zero mean and Gaussian. Note that this system’s eigenvalue is
inside the unit circle and the superscript 1 represents the system is currently not under
attack. Similarly, after the shiftppoint 𝑘 = 100, there is a constant-type intrusion signal
ℎ𝑘 = ℎ𝑘+1 enters the system and replaces the system measurement and in this case, the
system measurement becomes

𝑦𝑘2 = ℎ𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘

and the system state and measurement are shown as Fig 4.17.

(4.29)
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Figure 4.17: The first-order Discrete-Time stochastic system with a constant-type
control signal 𝒖𝐤 = 𝟏, where its state 𝒙𝒌 and measurement 𝒚𝒌 with its initial state
𝒙𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 =
𝟏𝟎𝟎.

Similarly, the throretical mean value of the system measurement 𝑦̅𝑘 can be found
using the sample mean method using (4.26) by setting up the system’s initial state mean
value 𝑥̅0 and the control signal 𝑢𝑘 . Knowing that 𝑢𝑘 is a constant control signal where
𝑢𝑘 = 1, (4.26) can be simplified as below

𝑘−1
𝑘

𝑦̅𝑘 = 𝐶 (𝐴 𝑥̅0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑘−𝑖−1 𝐵 ) + 1
𝑖=0

and the theoretical mean value of the system measurement is shown as Fig 4.18

(4.30)
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Figure 4.18: The first-order Discrete-Time stochastic system with a constant contorl
signal 𝒖𝒌 = 𝟏, where its theoretical sample mean value of the system measurement
̅𝒌 with its initial mean value of the system state 𝒙
̅𝟎 = 𝟐 and the Constant-Type
𝒚
sensor intrusion signal 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐 happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.

Similarly, using the algorithm mentioned in Fig 4.15, there is a comparison
between the system measurement and the theoretical sample mean value of the system
measurement, and it is defined as 𝑦̃𝑘 = 𝑦𝑘 − 𝑦̅𝑘 . Before the intrusion enters the system,
the value of 𝑦̃𝑘 should be close to zero because the value of 𝑦̅𝑘 is the mean value of 𝑦𝑘 at
each time step k. After the intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system and replaces the system
measurement, the comparision becomes 𝑦̃𝑘 = ℎ𝑘 − 𝑦̅𝑘 , which would not be close to zero
because 𝑦̅𝑘 is no longer the intrusion signal’s mean value. Fig 4.19 shows the value of 𝑦̃𝑘
when the constant-type intrusion signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system at the shiftpiont 𝑘 = 100.
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̃𝒌 when the Constant-Type sensor intrusion 𝒉𝒌 = 𝟐
Figure 4.19: The value of 𝒚
happens at shiftpoint 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎.

From Fig 4.19, changes of 𝑦̃𝑘 could show that there is a constant-type intrusion
signal ℎ𝑘 enters the system at shiftpoint 𝑘 = 100 and changes the system measurement.
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5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

5.1 Summary

In this thesis, an estimation algorithm based on a bank of Kalman Filters was
designed that is capable of detecting sensor intrusion problem in industrial control
systems. It is shown that when a hacker replaces the system measurement by different
types of the intrusion signals, the estimation algorithm designed in this thesis can detect
the changes of the system measurement by calculating the system state and measurement
estimates based on different intrusion possibilities. This was achieved by designing a
bank of Kalman filters together with calculating the probabilities of different hypotheses
on the system measurements. To set up the bank of Kalman filters, it is necessary to
know the system’s state and measurement equations. Step and ramp types of intrusion
signals either partially or totally replace the measurement signal at a certain time point so
that the system measurement does not give information about the system state. Thus, a
bank of Kalman filters was implemented, to calculate the system measurement with and
without the measurement being replaced by the intrusion signal.

After receiving the system measurement, the probabilities of each hypothesis
(unhacked and hacked with step or ramp) can be calculated using the Bayesian
Estimation algorithm. As mentioned in chapter 2, the initial probabilities for the hacked
and unhacked cases both need to be assumed so that the algorithm could be initialized.
After setting the initial probabilities for both assumptions, the probabilities can be
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calculated recursively with the given system measurement data. The convergence time
for the probabilities converging to one was measured and this was used as the speed
criterion of the estimation method. This performance of the algorithm was also tested
using different measurement signal to noise ratios.

A simpler estimation method, which is called the sample mean method, was also
implemented for the same system when there is a step-type intrusion signal replacing the
measurement. Since the system state and measurement mean value can be calculated
using this technique, the residual between the actual value of the measurement and the
theoretical mean value of the system measurement can be found and this can be used to
detect if there’s an intrusion signal. When there is no intrusion signal, the residual should
be close to zero because the theoretical mean value of the system measurement should be
close enough to the actual value of the system measurement. If the measurement is
replaced by the intrusion signal, the residual would be relatively larger, and the intrusion
signal can be detected.

5.2 Conclusions

The estimation algorithms implemented in this thesis were applied to two
different systems, a first-order system and a second-order system, with an additive white
noise component in the measurement. Two different type of intrusion signals are
considered, step and ramp replacing partially or totally the signal component of the
measurement in our attack model.
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In our scenarios, first, a first-order system was attacked by the step-type intrusion
signal, replacing the measurement by that intrusion signal. The simulations showed that
the intrusion was detected and the probability of each hypothesis (hypotheses 1: no
intrusion, hypoehtses 2: most of the signal component of intrusion) was calculated as
expected. Then, we focused on the step and ramp-type intrusion on the same first-order
system and after simulating the attack using step and ramp-type intrusion signal on the
first-order system, the result was also positive.

Next, the constant-type and the step and ramp-type intrusion targeting the secondorder system were also simulated. Similarly, the intrusion signal replaced modt of the
signal component of the system measurement by the intrusion signal at a certain time
point. For both cases, the simulations showed the attack can be detected and the
probability of each hypothesis was calculated and converged to correct values sufficiently
fast.

Furthermore, a short study on how the signal to noise ratio influences the speed
performance of the algorithm was also done, and this short study shows the behavior
effect of large signal to noise ratios on the speed of detection of the algorithm.

Lastly, a new estimation method, which is named the sample mean method, was
developed to detect the sensor intrusions when the intrusion signal replaces the
measurement. Using this sample mean technique, the theoretical sample mean value of
the system state and measurement can be calculated in time and by forming the residual
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between the system actual measurement and theoretical value of its sample mean, the
intrusion can be effectively detected.

5.3 Future Work

This work brings out new ideas in the detection of sensor intrusion using
estimation theory. The main objective of this work was to achieve a successful detection
of certain types of the sensor intrusion targeting the industrial control systems, where two
types of the intrusion signal were tested in this work. Other types of intrusion signals can
be applied to control systems and the performance of these estimation algorithms can be
tested.

The main technique developed in this work using a bank of Kalman filters only
applied to first order and second order linear, time-invariant systems with additive white
noise, that is of zero mean and Gaussian distributed, but can be applied to nonlinear (e.g.
with estended Kalman filters), time-varying systems of larger order affected by noises
with various other characteristics.

Furthermore, the extension of this work only used sample mean technique for the
first order system with constant-type intrusion and step and ramp-type intrusion and this
technique can also be applied to higher order systems.

Also, the relationship between the signal noise to ratio and the speed of the first
detection algorithm was only studied briefly. This relationship might be analyzed further
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to be able to find optimal signal to noise ratios for the best performance of these intrusion
detection estimation algorithms.
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APPENDIX: MATLAB CODES

The MATLAB codes used to implement the bank of Kalman filters algorithm and
the Sample Mean algorithm in this thesis are given in this Appendix.

1 MATLAB Code for the First-Order Discrete-Time system

%%
% Author: Jiayi Su
%%
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order Discrete-Time system
%% Cleaning
clear all
close all
clc
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system
A = 0.9;
B = 0;
C = 1;
D = 0;
F = 1;
G = 1;
kmax = 200; % Set up the time step kmax
x= zeros(1,kmax); % Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s
y = zeros(kmax,1); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s
vd = 0.1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise
wd = 0.05; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as
Gaussian
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax);
V1 = mean(V);
V2 = V-V1;
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax);
W1 = mean(W);
W2 = W-W1;
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%% Initial value of system state
x(1) = 2;
%% Simulating the system with its initial value for kmax times
for k = 1:kmax
x(k+1) = A*x(k)+F*V2(k);
y(k) = C*x(:,k)+G*W2(k);
end
%% Plot of results
figure,
plot(x) % Plot of the system state
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System State x')
legend('x')
figure,
plot(y) % Plot of the system measurement
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System Measurement y')
legend('y')
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2 MATLAB Code for the First-Order system with the Constant-Type intrusion
signal enters the system.
%%
% Author: Jiayi Su
%%
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order Discrete-Time system with the
%constant-type intrusion signal enters the system
%% Cleaning
clear all
close all
clc
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system
A = 0.9;
B = 0;
C = 1;
D = 0;
F = 1;
G = 1;
kmax = 200; % Set up the time step kmax
x1= zeros(1,kmax); % Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s
y = zeros(kmax,1); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s
vd = 0.1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise
wd = 0.05; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as
Gaussian
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax);
V1 = mean(V);
V2 = V-V1;
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax);
W1 = mean(W);
W2 = W-W1;
%% Initial value of system state
x1(1) = 2;

%% Attack model when the constant-type intrusion signal enters the system
A2 = [A 0; 0 1];
B2 = B;
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C2 = [0.05 C];
D2 = D;
F2 = [F 0]';
OBSERVABILITY = obsv(A2,C2) % Checking the system observability
ShiftPoint = 100; % Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system
%randi([80 120],1,1); % The shiftpoint can be select arbitrary using this function

p1(:,:,1)=100; % Set pup the initial value of the unhacked system error covariance P1
xhat1(:,1)=1; % Set up the initial unhacked estimated state x1_0_hat
p2(:,:,1) = p1(:,:,1)*eye(2); % Set pup the initial value of the hacked system error
covariance P2
xhat2(:,1) = [0,0]'; % Set up the initial hacked estimated state x2_0_hat
t = 1:kmax+1; % Set up the total time step for the system
ip = 0.5; % Set up the initial probability for the unhacked hypothesis
% Set up the space vector the storing the probability of the two hypothesis
pThetaZk1 = [ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)];
pThetaZk2 = [1-ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)];
%% Bank of Kalman Filter scheme
for k=1:kmax
if k< ShiftPoint
x1(k+1) = A*x1(k)+F*V2(k);
y(k) = C*x1(:,k)+G*W2(k);
else
h(k) = 10; % Intrusion signal enters the system
x2(:,k+1) = A2*[x1(k) h(k)]' + F2*V2(k);
y(k) = C2*x2(:,k) + G*W2(k);
end
% Estimator
p1(:,:,k+1)=A*p1(:,:,k)*A' (A*p1(:,:,k)*C'*C*p1(:,:,k)*A')/(C*p1(:,:,k)*C'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance update
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Kk1(:,k)=(A*p1(:,:,k)*C')/(C*p1(:,:,k)*C'+G*wd*G'); % Kalman Gain update
xhat1(:,k+1)=A*xhat1(:,k)+Kk1(:,k)*(y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k)); % State update

p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance
update
Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*wd*G');% Kalman Gain update
xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k));% State update
% Calculating the covariance for each Kalman Filter with its
% corresponding hypothesis omega in time
omega_k_1(k) = C * p1(:,:,k+1) * C' + G*wd*G';
omega_k_2(k) = C2 * p2(:,:,k+1) * C2' + G*wd*G';
% Calculating the system measurement estimate y_hat and the system
% innovation term y_tilde in time
yhat1(k) = C*xhat1(:,k);
y_tilde1(k)=y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k);
yhat2(k) = C2*xhat2(:,k);
y_tilde2(k)=y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k);
% Likelihood function of each hypothesis
pzkTheta1 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_1(k)))...
*exp(-0.5*y_tilde1(k)'*eye/omega_k_1(k)*y_tilde1(k));
pzkTheta2 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_2(k)))...
*exp(-0.5*y_tilde2(k)'*eye/omega_k_2(k)*y_tilde2(k));

% Weight update equations
denom = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k) + pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k);
% Conditional probability for each hypothesis
pThetaZk1(k+1) = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k)/denom;
pThetaZk2(k+1) = pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k)/denom;
end
% Plot of results
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figure,
plot(y) % System ture output
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System Measurement y')
legend('y')

tt = 1:kmax;
figure,
plot(tt,y_tilde1,tt,y_tilde2) % System innovation terms for both hypothesis
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('y tilde')
legend('y tilde1 = y - yhat1','y tilde2 = y - yhat2')
grid on
figure,
plot(t,pThetaZk1,'b',t,pThetaZk2,'r') % Conditional probability for each hypothesis
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('Probability')
legend('unhacked system','hacked system')
grid on
%% Convergence time for the conditional probability goes to 1
thresh = 0.99;
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaZk1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaZk2 > thresh,1)];
disp('Convergence time:')
t(convergenceIndex)
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3 MATLAB Code for First-Order system with the step and ramp-type intrusion
signal enters the system.
%%
% Author: Jiayi Su
%%
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order Discrete-Time system with Ramp%Type intrusion siganl
%% Cleaning
clear all
close all
clc
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system
A = 0.9;
B = 0;
C = 1;
D = 0;
F = 1;
G = 1;
kmax = 200; % Set up the time step kmax
x1= zeros(1,kmax); % Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s
y = zeros(kmax,1); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s
vd = 0.1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise
wd = 0.05; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as
Gaussian
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax);
V1 = mean(V);
V2 = V-V1;
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax);
W1 = mean(W);
W2 = W-W1;
%% Initial value of system state
x1(1) = 2;
%% Attack model when the step and ramp-type intrusion signal enters the system
H = [1 1; 0 1];
A2 = [A 0 0; 0 H(1,:); 0 H(2,:)];
B2 = B;
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C2 = [0.05 1 1];
D2 = D;
F2 = [F 0 0]';
OBSERVABILITY = obsv(A2,C2) % Check the observability for the attack model
RANK_OBSV_MODEL_2 = rank(OBSERVABILITY)
ShiftPoint = 100; % Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system
%randi([80 120],1,1); % The shiftpoint can be select arbitrary between 80 and 120
using this function
p1(:,:,1)=100; % Set up the initial value of the unhacked system error covariance P1
xhat1(:,1)=1; % Set up the initial unhacked estimated state x1_0_hat
p2(:,:,1) = 7*eye(3); % Set up the initial value of the hacked system error covariance P2
xhat2(:,1) = [0.1,0,0]'; % Set up the initial estimated state x2_0_hat for the attack model
t = 1:kmax+1;
ip = 0.5; %initial probability for the unhacked hypothesis
% Set up the space vector for storing the probability of the two hypothesis
pThetaZk1 = [ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)];
pThetaZk2 = [1-ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)];
%% Bank of Kalman Filter scheme
for k=1:kmax
% set up the step and ramp-type intrusion signal
h(:,1) = [1 0.1]';
h(:,k+1) = H*h(:,k);
if k< ShiftPoint
x1(k+1) = A*x1(k)+F*V2(k);
y(k) = C*x1(:,k)+G*W2(k);
else
% Intrusion signal enters the system
x2(:,k+1) = A2*[x1(k); h(:,k)] + F2*V2(k);
y(k) = C2*x2(:,k) + G*W2(k);
end
% Estimator
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p1(:,:,k+1)=A*p1(:,:,k)*A'(A*p1(:,:,k)*C'*C*p1(:,:,k)*A')/(C*p1(:,:,k)*C'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance update
Kk1(:,k)=(A*p1(:,:,k)*C')/(C*p1(:,:,k)*C'+G*wd*G'); % Kalman Gain update
xhat1(:,k+1)=A*xhat1(:,k)+Kk1(:,k)*(y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k)); % Estimated state update

p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance
update
Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*wd*G'); % Kalman Gain update
xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); % Estimated state
update
% Calculating the covariance for each Kalman Filter with its
% corresponding hypothesis omega in time
omega_k_1(k) = C * p1(:,:,k+1) * C' + G*wd*G';
omega_k_2(k) = C2 * p2(:,:,k+1) * C2' + G*wd*G';
% Calculating the system measurement estimate y_hat and the system
% innovation term y_tilde in time
y_tilde1(k)=y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k);
y_tilde2(k)=y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k);
% Likelihood function of each hypothesis
pzkTheta1 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_1(k)))...
*exp(-0.5*y_tilde1(k)'*eye/omega_k_1(k)*y_tilde1(k));
pzkTheta2 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_2(k)))...
*exp(-0.5*y_tilde2(k)'*eye/omega_k_2(k)*y_tilde2(k));
% Weight update equations
denom = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k) + pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k);
% Conditional probability for each hypothesis
pThetaZk1(k+1) = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k)/denom;
pThetaZk2(k+1) = pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k)/denom;
end
% Plot of results
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figure,
plot(y) % System ture output
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System Measurement y')
legend('y')
tt = 1:kmax;
figure,
plot(tt,y_tilde1,tt,y_tilde2) % System innovation terms for both hypothesis
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('y tilde')
legend('y tilde1 = y - yhat1','y tilde2 = y - yhat2')
grid on
figure,
plot(t,pThetaZk1,'b',t,pThetaZk2,'r') % Conditional probability for each hypothesis
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('Probability')
legend('unhacked system','hacked system')
grid on
%% Convergence time for the conditional probability goes to 1
thresh = 0.99;
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaZk1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaZk2 > thresh,1)];
disp('Convergence time:')
t(convergenceIndex)
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4 MATLAB Code for the second-order discrete-time system

%%
% Author: Jiayi Su
%%
% Description: MATLAB Code for modeling the Second-Order Discrete-Time system
%% Cleaning
clear all
close all
clc
%%
% Second-order Discrete-Time model
A1 = [0 0.9; -1 -1];
F1 = [1 0]';
C1 = [1 1];
G1 = 1;
EIGENVALUE_SYS_1 = eig(A1) % Check the system stability
OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1 = obsv(A1,C1) % check the system observability
RANK_OBSV_SYS_1 = rank(OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1)
kmax = 200;
% Error covariance for the systen state noise and measuremnt noise
vd = 1;
wd = 1;
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as
Gaussian
V1=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax);
V2 = mean(V1);
V = V1-V2;
W1=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax);
W2 = mean(W1);
W = W1-W2;
x1 = zeros(2,kmax); % Create an x1 vector of length kmax, width 2 and fill it with 0s
y = zeros(1,kmax); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s
% Set up the initial value for the second-order system
x1(:,1) = [2,2]';
%% Simulating the system with its initial value for kmax times
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for k = 1:kmax
x1(:,k+1) = A1*x1(:,k) + F1*V(k);
y(k) = C1*x1(:,k) + G1*W(k);
end
%% Plot of results
figure,
plot(x1(1,:)) % Plot of the system first state
legend('x1')
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System State x_1')
figure,
plot(x1(2,:)) % Plot of the system second state
legend('x2')
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System State x_2')
figure,
plot(y) % Plot of the system measurement
legend('y')
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System Measurement y')
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5 MATLAB Code for the second-order discrete-time system with constant-type
intrusion signal
%%
% Author: Jiayi Su
%%
% Description: MATLAB Code for the Second-Order Discrete-Time system with
% Constant-Type intrusion signal
%% Cleaning
clear all
close all
clc
%% Systen matrices for the Second-Order system
A1 = [0 0.9; -1 -1];
F1 = [1 0]';
C1 = [1 1];
G1 = 1;
EIGENVALUE_SYS_1 = eig(A1) % Check the system eigenvalue for the system
stability
OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1 = obsv(A1,C1) % Check the system observability
RANK_OBSV_SYS_1 = rank(OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1)
kmax = 500; % Set up the time step kmax
vd = 1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise
wd = 1; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as
Gaussian
V1=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax);
V2 = mean(V1);
V = V1-V2;
W1=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax);
W2 = mean(W1);
W = W1-W2;
x1 = zeros(2,kmax);
y = zeros(1,kmax);
%% Initial value of system state
x1(:,1) = [2,2]';
%% Attack model when the constant-type intrusion signal enters the system
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A2 = [A1(1,:) 0; A1(2,:) 0; 0 0 1 ];
F2 = [F1' 0]';
C2 = [0 0.1 1];
G2 = G1;
EIGENVALUE_SYS_2 = eig(A2) % Check the eigenvalue for the attack model for the
system stability
OBSERVABILITY_ATTACK_MODEL = obsv(A2,C2) % Check the observability for
the attack model
RANK_OBSV_ATTACK_MODEL = rank(OBSERVABILITY_ATTACK_MODEL)
p1(:,:,1) = 100*eye(2); % Set up the initial value of the unhacked system error covariance
P1
xhat1(:,1) = [0 0]'; % Set up the initial unhacked estimated state x1_0_hat
p2(:,:,1) = 100*eye(3); % Set up the initial value of the hacked system error covariance
P2
xhat2(:,1) = [0 0 0]'; % Set up the initial hacked estimated state x2_0_hat
t = 1:kmax+1;
ip = 0.5; % Set up the initial probability for the unhacked system
% Set up the space vector the storing the probability of the two hypothesis
pThetaZk1 = [ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)];
pThetaZk2 = [1-ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)];
ShiftPoint = 250;% Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system
%randi([200 300],1,1); % The shiftpoint can be select arbitrary between 200 and 300
using this function
% Bank of Kalman Filter scheme
for k = 1:kmax

if k< ShiftPoint
x1(:,k+1) = A1*x1(:,k) + F1 *V(k);
y(k) = C1*x1(:,k) + G1*W(k);
else
h(k) = 20;% the constant-type intrusion signal enters the system
x2(:,k+1) = A2*[x1(:,k); h(k)] + F2 *V(k);
y(k) = C2*x2(:,k) + G2*W(k);
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end
% Estimator
p1(:,:,k+1)=A1*p1(:,:,k)*A1'(A1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'*C1*p1(:,:,k)*A1')/(C1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance
update
Kk1(:,k)=(A1*p1(:,:,k)*C1')/(C1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'+G1*wd*G1'); % Kalman Gain
update
xhat1(:,k+1)=A1*xhat1(:,k)+Kk1(:,k)*(y(k)-C1*xhat1(:,k)); % State update

p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance
update
Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G2*wd*G2'); % Kalman Gain
update
xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); % State update
% Calculating the covariance for each Kalman Filter with its
% corresponding hypothesis omega in time
omega_k_1(k) = C1 * p1(:,:,k+1) * C1' + G1*wd*G1';
omega_k_2(k) = C2 * p2(:,:,k+1) * C2' + G2*wd*G2';
% Calculating the system innovation term in time using system true
% measurment and the system estimated measurement
y_tilde1(k)=y(k)-C1*xhat1(:,k);
y_tilde2(k)=y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k);
% Likelihood functions for each hypothesis
pzkTheta1 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_1(k)))...
*exp(-0.5*y_tilde1(k)'*eye/omega_k_1(k)*y_tilde1(k));
pzkTheta2 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_2(k)))...
*exp(-0.5*y_tilde2(k)'*eye/omega_k_2(k)*y_tilde2(k));
% Weight update equations
denom = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k) + pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k);
% Conditional probability for each hypothesis
pThetaZk1(k+1) = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k)/denom;
pThetaZk2(k+1) = pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k)/denom;
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end
% Calculate the system Signal Noise Ration before the system is intruded
X = dlyap(A1,F1*vd*F1');
SNR = (C1*C1'*trace(X))/wd

% Plot of the results
figure,
plot(y) % System true output
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System Measurement y')
legend('y')

tt = 1:kmax;
figure,
plot(tt,y_tilde1,tt,y_tilde2) % System innovation terms for each hypothesis
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('y tilde')
legend('y tilde1 = y - yhat1','y tilde2 = y - yhat2')
grid on
figure,
plot(t,pThetaZk1,'b',t,pThetaZk2,'r') % Conditional probability for each hypothesis
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('Probability')
legend('unhacked system','hacked system')
grid on
%% Convergence time for the conditional probability goes to 1
thresh = 0.99;
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaZk1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaZk2 > thresh,1)];
disp('Convergence time:')
t(convergenceIndex)
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6 MATLAB Code for the second-order discrete-time system with step and ramptype intrusion signal
%%
% Author: Jiayi Su
%%
% Description: MATLAB Code for the Second-Order Discrete-Time system with
% Step and ramp-type intrusion signal
%% Cleaning
clear all
close all
clc
%% Systen matrices for the Second-Order system
A1 = [0 0.9; -1 -1];
F1 = [1 0]';
C1 = [1 1];
G1 = 1;
EIGENVALUE_SYS_1 = eig(A1) % Check the system eigenvalue for the stability
OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1 = obsv(A1,C1) % Check the system observability
RANK_OBSV_SYS_1 = rank(OBSERVABILITY_SYS_1)
kmax = 500; % Set up the time step kmax
vd = 1; % Set up the covariance of the system state noise
wd = 1; % Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as
Gaussian
V1=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax);
V2 = mean(V1);
V = V1-V2;
W1=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax);
W2 = mean(W1);
W = W1-W2;
x1 = zeros(2,kmax); % Create an x vector of length kmax, width 2 and fill it with 0s
y = zeros(1,kmax); % Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s
x1(:,1) = [2,2]'; % Set up the system initial state
%% Attack model when the step and ramp-type intrusion signal enters the system
H = [1 1; 0 1];
A2 = [A1(1,:) 0 0; A1(2,:) 0 0; 0 0 H(1,:); 0 0 H(2,:) ];
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F2 = [F1' 0 0]';
C2 = [0 0.1 1 0];
G2 = G1;
OBSERVABILITY_ATTACK_MODEL = obsv(A2,C2) % Check the observability for
the attack model
RANK_OBSV_ATTACK_MODEL = rank(OBSERVABILITY_ATTACK_MODEL)

p1(:,:,1) = 100*eye(2); % Set up the initial value of the unhacked system error covariance
P1
xhat1(:,1) = [0 0]'; % Set up the initial unhacked estimated state x1_0_hat
p2(:,:,1) = 100*eye(4); % Set up the initial value of the hacked system error covariance
P2
xhat2(:,1) = [0 0 0 0]'; % Set up the initial estimated state x2_0_hat for the attack model
t = 1:kmax+1;
ip = 0.5; %initial probability for the unhacked hypothesis
% Set up the space vector for storing the probability of the two hypothesis
pThetaZk1 = [ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)];
pThetaZk2 = [1-ip NaN(1,length(t)-1)];
ShiftPoint = 250;% Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system
%randi([200 300],1,1); % The shiftpoint can be select arbitrary between 200 and 300
using this function

%% Bank of Kalman Filter scheme
for k = 1:kmax
% set up the step and ramp-type intrusion signal
h(:,1) = [1 0.1]';
h(:,k+1) = H*h(:,k);
if k< ShiftPoint
x1(:,k+1) = A1*x1(:,k) + F1 *V(k);
y(k) = C1*x1(:,k) + G1*W(k);
else
% Intrusion signal enters the system
x2(:,k+1) = A2*[x1(:,k); h(:,k)] + F2 *V(k);
y(k) = C2*x2(:,k) + G2*W(k);
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end
% Estimator
p1(:,:,k+1)=A1*p1(:,:,k)*A1'(A1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'*C1*p1(:,:,k)*A1')/(C1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance
update
Kk1(:,k)=(A1*p1(:,:,k)*C1')/(C1*p1(:,:,k)*C1'+G1*wd*G1'); % Kalman Gain
update
xhat1(:,k+1)=A1*xhat1(:,k)+Kk1(:,k)*(y(k)-C1*xhat1(:,k)); % State Estimate
update

p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+wd)+vd; % Error covariance
update
Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G2*wd*G2'); % Kalman Gain
update
xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); % State Estimate
update
% Calculating the covariance for each Kalman Filter with its
% corresponding hypothesis omega in time
omega_k_1(k) = C1 * p1(:,:,k+1) * C1' + G1*wd*G1';
omega_k_2(k) = C2 * p2(:,:,k+1) * C2' + G2*wd*G2';
% Calculating the system measurement estimate y_hat and the system
% innovation term y_tilde in time
y_tilde1(k)=y(k)-C1*xhat1(:,k);
y_tilde2(k)=y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k);
% Likelihood function of each hypothesis
pzkTheta1 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_1(k)))...
*exp(-0.5*y_tilde1(k)'*eye/omega_k_1(k)*y_tilde1(k));
pzkTheta2 = (2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(omega_k_2(k)))...
*exp(-0.5*y_tilde2(k)'*eye/omega_k_2(k)*y_tilde2(k));
% Weight update equations
denom = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k) + pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k);
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% Conditional probability for each hypothesis
pThetaZk1(k+1) = pzkTheta1*pThetaZk1(k)/denom;
pThetaZk2(k+1) = pzkTheta2*pThetaZk2(k)/denom;
end
% Plot of results
figure,
plot(y) % System ture output
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System Measurement y')
legend('y')
tt = 1:kmax;
figure,
plot(tt,y_tilde1,tt,y_tilde2) % System innovation terms for both hypothesis
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('y tilde')
legend('y tilde1 = y - yhat1','y tilde2 = y - yhat2')
grid on
figure,
plot(t,pThetaZk1,'b',t,pThetaZk2,'r') % Conditional probability for each hypothesis
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('Probability')
legend('unhacked system','hacked system')
grid on
%% Convergence time for the conditional probability goes to 1
thresh = 0.99;
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaZk1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaZk2 > thresh,1)];
disp('Convergence time:')
t(convergenceIndex)
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7 MATLAB Code for the Sample Mean algorithm

%Cleaning
clear all
close all
clc
%%
% Author: Jiayi Su
%%
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order system without control signal with
constant-type intrusion signal using Sample Mean algorithm
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system
A = 0.9;
B = 0;
C = 3;
D = 0;
F = 1;
G = 1;
kmax = 200; % Set up the time step kmax
x= zeros(1,kmax);% Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s
y = zeros(kmax,1);% Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s
x_mean = NaN(1,kmax);% Create an x_mean vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s
y_mean = NaN(kmax,1);% Create an y_mean vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s
vd = 0.01;% Set up the covariance of the system state noise
wd = 0.01;% Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise
EIGENVALUE = eig(A) % Calculate the system eigenvalues
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as
Gaussian
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax);
V1 = mean(V);
V2 = V-V1;
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax);
W1 = mean(W);
W2 = W-W1;

x(1) = 2;% Set up the system initial state
shiftpoint = 100;% Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system
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%Sasmple Mean scheme
for k = 1:kmax
x(k+1) = A*x(k)+F*V2(k);
d = 2; % set up the constant-tyoe intrusion signal
% calculating the sample mean value of the system state and system measurement
x_mean(k) = (A^k)*x(1);
y_mean(k) = C*x_mean(k);
if k<= shiftpoint
y(k) = C*x(:,k)+G*W2(k);
% Comparision between the ture measurement and the sample mean
% measurement
y_tilde(k) = y(k) - y_mean(k);
else
% intrusion signal enters the system
y(k) = d + G*W2(k);
% Comparision between the ture measurement and the sample mean
% measurement
y_tilde(k) = y(k) - y_mean(k);
end
end

% Plot of results
figure,
subplot(2,1,1) % system state
plot(x)
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System State x')
legend('x')
subplot(2,1,2) % system measurement
plot(y)
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System Measurement y')
legend('y')

figure, % sample mean value of the system measurement
plot(y_mean)
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xlabel('Time')
ylabel('y mean')
legend('y mean')

figure, % residule between the system ture measurement and the system sample mean
measurement
plot(y_tilde)
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('y tilde')
legend('y tilde = y - y mean')
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8 MATLAB Code for the Sample Mean algorithm
%Cleaning
clear all
close all
clc
%%
% Author: Jiayi Su
%%
% Description: MATLAB Code for the First-Order system with constant control signal
with constant-type intrusion signal using Sample Mean algorithm
%% Systen matrices for the First-Order system
A = 0.9;
B = 1;
C = 2;
D = 1;
u = 1; % constant control signal u = 1
F = 1;
G = 1;
kmax = 200;% Set up the time step kmax

x= zeros(1,kmax);% Create an x vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s
y = zeros(kmax,1);% Create an y vector of width kmax and fill it with 0s

y_mean = NaN(kmax,1);% Create an y_mean vector of length kmax and fill it with 0s

vd = 0.01;% Set up the covariance of the system state noise
wd = 0.01;% Set up the covariance of the system measurement noise

EIGENVALUE = eig(A)% Calculate the system eigenvalues
%% Creating the noise for system state and measurement, which are distrubuted as
Gaussian
V=sqrt(vd)*randn(1,kmax);
V1 = mean(V);
V2 = V-V1;
W=sqrt(wd)*randn(1,kmax);
W1 = mean(W);
W2 = W-W1;
x(1) = 2;% Set up the system initial state
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shiftpoint = 100;% Set up the shiftpoint where the intrusion signal enters the system
syms i
%Sasmple Mean scheme
for k = 1:kmax
x(k+1) = A*x(k) + B*u + F*V2(k);
d = 2;% set up the constant-tyoe intrusion signal
% calculating the sample mean value of the system state and system measurement
y_mean(k) = C*(A^k)*x(1) + C*symsum(A^(k-i-1)*B*u, 0,k-1);
if k<= shiftpoint
y(k) = C*x(:,k)+G*W2(k);
% Comparision between the ture measurement and the sample mean
% measurement
ytilde(k) = y(k) - y_mean(k);
else
% intrusion signal enters the system
y(k) = d + G*W2(k);
% Comparision between the ture measurement and the sample mean
% measurement
ytilde(k) = y(k) - y_mean(k);
end
end

% Plot of results
figure,
subplot(2,1,1)% system state
plot(x)
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System State x')
legend('x')
subplot(2,1,2)% system measurement
plot(y)
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('System Measurement y')
legend('y')

figure,% sample mean value of the system measurement
plot(y_mean)
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xlabel('Time')
ylabel('y mean')
legend('y mean')
figure, % residule between the system ture measurement and the system sample mean
measurement
plot(ytilde)
xlabel('Time')
ylabel('y mean')
legend('y tilde = y - y mean')

